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No 11, November 1990

FBIS 50th Anniversary Note

To Our Consumers:

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We members of the current staff of FBIS extend our thanks to consumers for their interest in FBIS products. To past staffers we extend our thanks for helping the service reach this anniversary year. At the same time, we pledge our continued commitment to providing a useful information service.



R. W. Manners
Director
Foreign Broadcast Information Service

Soviet Union SOCIOLOGICAL STUDIES

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SOCIOLOGICAL STUDIES

No 11, November 1990

The Special Settlers (From Documentation of USSR NKVD—MVD)

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[Article by Viktor Nikolayevich Zemskov, candidate of historical sciences and senior science associate at the Institute for the History of the USSR of the USSR Academy of Sciences. This is the first time he appears in our journal]

[Text] The years of 1930s to the beginning of the 1950s have gone down in the history of our nation as a period of widely practiced expulsion and deportations of large masses of people and even entire peoples. A predominant majority of the deported was sent for special settlement. A smaller portion became exiles (sent to exile for a particular term), exiled settlers (sent to exile in perpetuity) or administratively exiled. Some of them also fell into the GULAG [Main Administration for Corrective Labor] Camps. A specific feature of the current article is that it gives statistics not for the

deportations generally but only the special settlers (the term "deportation" and "special settlement") are not synonyms.

The history of special settlement goes back to the beginning of 1929, when the first batches of peasants (so-called kulaks and kulak henchmen) were sent for special settlement (labor settlement). Or this was also called "kulak exile." In the information of the Department for Special Migrants of the OGPU [United State Political Administration] GULAG, under the title "Information on Expelled Kulakery in 1930-1931," it states that during this period some 381,026 families with a total of 1,803,392 persons were expelled (sent to special migration) [1]. This same document provides statistics on the expelled families by regions (Table 1).

In the given information of the Department for Special Migrants of the OGPU GULAG, individual discrepancies are encountered in the statistical tabulations. As a total the number of families given in the column "Exiled From" is not 381,026 but 388,334, that is, 7,308 more (the latter figure precisely corresponds to the number of families expelled from the Western Oblast to the Urals). In the column "Exiled To" the total number of expelled families is 388,481 or 147 more than in the column "Exiled From" (the figure 147, undoubtedly, is formed from the 97 families expelled from the Ukraine to Yakutia and the 50 from Nizhegorodskiy Kray to Kazakhstan). Consequently, correspondingly, 63,817 and 9,219 families were expelled from the Ukraine and Nizhegorodskiy Kray.

Table 1: Dispatch of Peasants for "Kulak Exile" in 1930-1931 [2]

Exiled From	No. of Exile Families	Exiled To	No. of Families
Ukraine	63,720	Northern Kray	19,658
		Urals	32,127
		Western Siberia	6,556
		Eastern Siberia	5,056
		Yakutia	97
Northern Caucasus	38,404	Far Eastern Kray	323
		Urals	25,995
		Northern Caucasus	12,409
Lower Volga	30,933	Northern Kray	10,963
		Urals	1,878
		Kazakhstan	18,092
Middle Volga	23,006	Northern Kray	5,566
		Urals	663
		Eastern Siberia	620
		Kazakhstan	11,477
		Far Eastern Kray	2,180
Central Chernozem Oblast	26,006	Middle Volga	2,500
		Northern Kray	10,236
		Urals	1,408
		Eastern Siberia	2,367
		Kazakhstan	10,544

Table 1: Dispatch of Peasants for "Kulak Exile" in 1930-1931 [2] (Continued)

Exiled From	No. of Exile Families	Exiled To	No. of Families
		Far Eastern Kray	1,097
		Yakutia	354
Belorussia	15,724	Northern Kray	4,763
		Urals	9,113
		Far Eastern Kray	1,561
		Yakutia	287
Crimea	4,325	Northern Kray	1,553
		Urals	2,772
Tataria	9,424	Urals	7,810
		Far Eastern Kray	1,614
Urals	28,394	Urals	26,854
		Leningrad Oblast	1,540
Nizhegorodskiy Kray	9,169	Northern Kray	2,471
		Urals	5,201
		Kazakhstan	50
		Nizhegorodskiy Kray	1,497
Western Oblast	7,308	Urals	7,308
Bashkiria	12,820	Western Siberia	5,305
		Eastern Siberia	1,515
		Bashkiria	6,000
Northern Kray	3,061	Northern Kray	3,061
Ivanovo Industrial Oblast	3,655	Urals	3,655
Moscow Oblast	10,813	Urals	3,112
		Western Siberia	4,729
		Kazakhstan	2,972
Leningrad Oblast	8,604	Urals	337
		Western Siberia	1,269
		Eastern Siberia	929
		Yakutia	725
		Leningrad Oblast	5,344
Far Eastern Kray	2,922	Far Eastern Kray	2,922
Western Siberia	52,091	Western Siberia	52,091
Eastern Siberia	16,068	Eastern Siberia	16,068
Central Asia	6,944	Kazakhstan	159
		Northern Caucasus	2,213
		Ukraine	3,444
		Central Asia	1,128
Kazakhstan	6,765	Kazakhstan	6,765
Transcaucasus	870	Kazakhstan	870

Prior to 1934, the peasants sent into "kulak exile" were termed special migrants, in 1934-1944, labor settlers and from 1944 special settlers (all these three terms are synonyms). Regardless of the constant arrivals of peasants in "kulak exile," the number of the special migrants (labor settlers) was significantly lower than the number

dispatched there. The main reasons for this were primarily the high mortality of the expelled peasants during transporting and during the first years of life in special settlement and their mass flight. The dynamics of "kulak exile" is shown in Table 2.

Table 2: Dynamics of Movement of Special Migrants (Labor Settlers) ("Kulak Exile") [3]

	1932	1933	1934	1935	1936	1937	1938	1939	1940	Total for 1932- 1940
Presence on 1 January	1,317,022	1,142,084	1,072,546	973,693	1,017,133	916,787	877,651	938,552	997,513	
Arriving during year	201,502	398,407	254,997	246,194	164,902	128,047	424,565	220,699	137,278	2,176,600
Including:										
Births	18,053	17,082	14,033	26,122	27,617	29,036	31,867	33,716	32,732	230,258
Arriving from other republics, krais and oblasts	71,236	268,091	24,196	66,704	16,645	10,789	11,765	13,467	6,929	489,822
Arriving from other organizations			79,241	40,874	54,342	49,249	331,997	132,627	78,882	767,212
Returning from escape	37,978	54,211	45,443	33,238	23,075	17,384	10,939	8,290	4,562	235,120
Other reasons for arrival*	74,235	59,023	92,084	79,256	43,223	21,589	37,997	32,599	14,182	454,188
Loss for year	376,440	467,945	353,850	202,754	265,248	167,183	363,664	161,738	204,579	2,563,401
Including:										
Escaped	207,010	215,856	87,617	43,070	26,193	27,809	9,712	7,345	4,430	629,042
Condemned				3,038	3,492	17,385	23,830	2,644	2,823	53,212
Died	89,754	151,601	40,012	22,173	19,891	17,037	15,961	16,691	16,401	389,521
Released as "incorrectly exiled"			15,366	5,736	5,678	4,119	616	962	578	33,055
Released for studies								11,204	7,247	18,451
Released under decree of USSR SNK of 22 October 1938 ¹								1,824	77,661	79,485
Transferred for support			9,663	9,137	8,471	4,805	1,489	1,246	1,475	36,286
Transferred to other organizations			94,888	39,391	63,608	58,412	266,326	93,470	80,300	696,395
Other reasons for loss**	79,676	100,488	106,304	80,209	137,915	37,616	45,730	26,352	13,664	627,954
Presence on 31 December	1,142,084	1,072,546	973,693	1,017,133	916,787	877,651	938,552	997,513	930,221	

* The line "Other Reasons for Arrival" in 1932-1933 also included the special migrants returning from special settlements upon serving the period of imprisonment in camps and prisons as well as those transferred within the oblast (krai) from certain economic bodies to others.

** The line "Other Reasons for Loss" in 1932-1933 also included convicts, "incorrectly exiled," transferred to support and transferred within the oblast (krai); in 1935-1937, persons released to study and those who married the nonlabor settlers.

¹ According to the Decree of the USSR SNK [Council of People's Commissars] of 22 October 1938, the children of former kulaks who were labor settlers were released upon reaching the age of 16 (author's note).

As of 1 January 1938, of the 353,912 labor settlers employed in the national economy, 16,818 were employed in the gold mining industry, 37,360 in the coal industry, 88,133 in the metallurgical, machine building, chemical, ore mining and railroad car building industries, 63,926 in the lumber industry, 5,166 in the system

of the RSFSR Narkomlegprom [People's Commissariat of Light Industry] and Narkommestprom [People's Commissariat of Local Industry], in the textile and other sectors of industry, in utility enterprises and handicraft trades, 19,105 on the sovkhozes of the USSR Narkomzem [People's Commissariat of Agriculture] and

Narkomsovkhozov [People's Commissariat of Sovkhozes], predominantly in cotton processing and livestock raising, 9,055 in the food industry of the USSR Narkomishchepron [People's Commissariat of Food Industry], predominantly at the sugar beet enterprises and slaughterhouses 28,212 in the various small economic organizations and in handicraft cooperatives, 12,483 in the Belbatkombinat [White Sea-Baltic Combine], predominantly in lumbering, and 73,654 persons in the agriculture of the irregular labor settlement artels [4].

In 1940, a new large contingent of special settlers appeared under the title "Polish settlers and refugees." The settlers were migrants from Poland, basically former servicemen in the Polish Army who had distinguished themselves in the 1920 Polish-Soviet War and in the 1920s and 1930s had been given land in the rayons inhabited by Ukrainians and Belorussians. In addition, they carried out definite police functions against the local population. After, in 1939, the Western Ukraine and Western Belorussia had been incorporated in the USSR, the Polish settlers were declared to be "evil enemies of the working people" and together with their families expelled to Siberia, Kazakhstan, the Volga, the Urals and the European North of the USSR. Of course, not only the settlers were expelled. Tens of thousands of other persons of Polish nationality were subjected to deportation, including refugees from Nazi-occupied Poland. As a total, from February 1940 through June 1941, around 380,000 Poles were deported from the western oblasts of the Ukraine and Belorussia as well as from Lithuania. A majority of them went for special settlement. As of 1 April 1941, when the deportation of the Poles had not yet been completed, the contingent of special settlers "Polish settlers and refugees" numbered 210,559 persons [6] (Table 4).

Table 3: Geography of Settlement of Labor Settlers ("Kulak Exile") (on 1 January 1941) [5]

Place of Exile	Number of	
	Families	Persons
Kazakhstan	46,091	180,015
Novosibirsk Oblast	46,163	176,924
Sverdlovsk Oblast	27,492	87,396
Molotov Oblast	20,401	73,235
Krasnoyarsk Kray	14,154	50,291
Chelyabinsk Oblast	13,127	46,227
Ordzhonikidze Kray	11,251	44,376
Arkhangelsk Oblast	12,683	36,181
Omsk Oblast	9,400	35,909
Irkutsk Oblast	7,877	29,001
Khabarovsk Kray	5,765	25,439
Chita Oblast	5,609	23,511

Table 3: Geography of Settlement of Labor Settlers ("Kulak Exile") (on 1 January 1941) [5] (Continued)

Place of Exile	Number of	
	Families	Persons
Belbaltlag [White Sea-Baltic Canal Camp] of NKVD*	7,261	21,535
Komi ASSR	5,339	17,492
Murmansk Oblast	5,333	15,336
Uzbekistan	3,321	11,947
Bashkir ASSR	3,105	11,502
Vologda Oblast	3,225	10,008
Karelo-Finnish SSR	3,382	9,977
Tajikistan	2,706	8,528
Kirghizia	1,733	7,400
Kirov Oblast	2,233	7,163
Ukraine	1,682	6,517
Yakut ASSR	1,253	3,579
Leningrad Oblast	986	3,089
Kuybyshev Oblast	817	2,747
Altay Kray	817	2,629
Stalingrad Oblast	758	2,433
Chkalov Oblast	593	2,105
Sevnikel [Northern Nickel] Combine of NKVD*	769	1,993
Buryat-Mongol ASSR	486	1,671
Vorkutlag [Vorkuta Camp Administration] of NKVD*	445	1,621
Kalmyk ASSR	259	1,029
Primorskiy Kray	219	1,005
Norilag [Norilsk Camp Administration] of NKVD*	23	166
Northern Ossetian ASSR	86	156
TOTAL:	266,844	960,133

* Only labor settlers, without prisoners (author's note).

Table 4: Geography of Settlement of Special Settlers Who Were Polish Settlers and Refugees (on 1 April 1941) [7]

Place of Exile	Total	Including	
		Settlers	Refugees
Arkhangelsk Oblast	50,944	38,622	12,322
Sverdlovsk Oblast	26,702	13,562	13,140
Novosibirsk Oblast	19,628	3,191	16,437

Table 4: Geography of Settlement of Special Settlers Who Were Polish Settlers and Refugees (on 1 April 1941) [7] (Continued)

Place of Exile	Total	Including	
		Settlers	Refugees
Komi ASSR	18,772	9,954	8,818
Krasnoyarsk Kray	14,788	13,339	1,449
Vologda Oblast	13,357	9,433	3,924
Ivanovo Oblast	11,513	11,513	—
Molotov Oblast	10,544	9,040	1,504
Altay Kray	9,886	5,926	3,960
Omsk Oblast	8,538	6,946	1,592
Mari ASSR	5,693	—	5,693
Kazakhstan	5,307	5,307	—
Yakut ASSR	3,510	—	3,510
Irkutsk Oblast	2,914	593	2,321
Gorkiy Oblast	2,604	1,725	879
Kirov Oblast	2,204	2,204	—
Chelyabinsk Oblast	2,172	1,653	519
Chkalov Oblast	625	625	—
Yaroslavl Oblast	503	503	—
Bashkir ASSR	275	275	—
Unzhlag [Unzha Camp Administration] of NKVD*	80	80	—
TOTAL:	210,559	134,491	76,068

* Only special settlers, without prisoners (author's note).

The attitude of the then leadership of the USSR to the settlers as enemies and to the refugees as interned emigres in practice, under the conditions of special settlement, was expressed in the fact that the refugees had a marked advantage in moving into relatively well-provided housing with food supply, winter clothing and so forth. This was one of the main reasons that among the settlers the mortality rate was several-fold higher

than the refugees. From the moment of arrival in special settlement and until 1 July 1941, 4,211 persons were born and 12,319 persons died, including, respectively, 2,694 and 10,557 among the settlers and 1,517 and 1,762 among the refugees (this does not include those who were born and died in January-March 1941 in Kazakhstan, the Komi ASSR, Molotov and Ivanovo Oblasts) [8].

It is essential to bear in mind that the contingent of special settlers "Polish settlers and refugees" was multinational in its make-up (see Table 5).

Table 5: National Composition of Special Settlers—"Polish Settlers and Refugees" (on 1 January 1941) [9]

Nationality	Total	Including	
		Settlers	Refugees
Poles	96,593	88,654	7,939
Jews	59,031	179	58,852
Ukrainians	9,334	7,811	1,523
Belorussians	9,084	9,022	62
Germans	271	152	119
Other	2,730	1,514	1,216
TOTAL:	177,043	107,332	69,711

Note: On 1 April 1941, information was lacking on the nationality of 33,539 special settlers (27,270 settlers and 6,269 refugees) living predominantly in Kazakhstan, Krasnoyarsk Kray and Vologda Oblast.

Table 6: Dynamics of the Movement of Special Settlers Who Were Germans and Kalmyks Exiled From the Northern Caucasus, the Crimea and Georgia From the Moment of Initial Exile Until 1 October 1948 [13]

Contingents	Born	Died	Released	Reported on 1 October 1948
Germans	25,792	45,275	37,784	1,012,754
From Northern Caucasus	28,120	146,892	7,018	452,737
From Crimea	6,564	44,887	3,531	185,603
Kalmyks	2,702	16,594	1,364	74,918
From Georgia	2,873	15,432	2,175	80,935
TOTAL:	66,051	269,080	51,872	1,806,947

Table 7: Number and Composition of Special Settlers (on 15 July 1949) [27]

Contingents	Total	Including		
		Men	Women	Children
Germans	1,093,490	286,311	435,413	371,766
From Northern Caucasus	463,633	114,139	148,916	200,578
From Crimea	192,953	55,594	75,346	62,013
Kalmyk	77,663	22,380	29,577	25,706

Table 7: Number and Composition of Special Settlers (on 15 July 1949) [27] (Continued)

Contingents	Total	Including		
		Men	Women	Children
From Georgia in 1944	81,575	19,421	25,107	37,047
From Baltic in 1949	91,204	24,022	40,877	26,305
From Moldavia in 1949	34,763	9,233	13,702	11,828
From Black Sea Coast	57,246	18,319	18,892	20,035
Total exiled special settlers (exiled in perpetuity)	2,092,527	549,419	787,830	755,278
OUN members	95,552	22,569	48,583	24,400
Vlasovites	131,394	131,130	264	—
From Lithuania 1945-1948	46,456	13,453	19,698	13,305
Under Ukase of 2 June 1948	22,498	11,744	10,754	—
Volksdeutsche	3,232	515	1,899	818
German supporters	2,277	524	1,162	591
IPKh	1,028	168	618	242
Former kulaks	124,585	34,317	41,694	48,574
Poles	32,488	8,580	12,473	11,435
Total special settlers (term exiles)	459,510	223,000	137,145	99,365
TOTAL:	2,552,037	772,419	924,975	854,643

Table 8: Birth and Death Rates Among Special Settlers in 1948-1949 [28]

Contingents	Born	Died
Germans	46,805	22,293
From Northern Caucasus	24,179	25,434
From Crimea	5,349	6,038
From Georgia in 1944	3,020	4,044
Former kulaks	2,262	3,430
Kalmyks	3,193	4,669
OUN members	879	6,382
From Lithuania in 1945-1948	396	2,425
Volksdeutsche	64	109
German supporters	35	67
Poles	653	290
IPKh	9	76
Vlasovites	—	2,768
Under Ukase of 2 June 1948	—	273
From Baltic in 1949	469	2,047
From Moldavia in 1949	192	156
From Black Sea Coast	456	601
TOTAL:	87,961	81,102

During the first period of the Great Patriotic War, the Poles deported in 1940-1941 from the Western oblasts were released from special settlement. Two Polish armies were organized on the basis of them on the USSR territory.

During the Great Patriotic War, entire peoples began to be sent to special settlement. We possess information on the number of persons arriving for special settlement (not including those who died and fled in transporting). From the end of August 1941, the expulsion of the Germans began. During the war, 949,829 persons were sent for special settlement, including 446,480 expelled from the former Volga German ASSR, 149,206 from Krasnodar and Stavropol Krays, the Kabardino-Balkar and North Ossetian ASSRs, as well as from Tula Oblast (including around 50,000 Germans evacuated in the summer of 1941 from the Crimea to Stavropol Kray), 79,569 from Zaporozhye, Voroshilovgrad and Stalin Oblasts, 46,706 from Saratov Oblast, 46,356 from Azerbaijan, Armenia and Georgia, 38,288 from Rostov Oblast, 26,245 from Stalingrad Oblast, 11,000 from Leningrad and Leningrad Oblast, 8,787 from Kuybyshev Oblast, 8,640 from Moscow and Moscow Oblast, 7,306 from Dagestan and the Checheno-Ingush ASSR, 5,965 from the Kalmyk ASSR, 5,308 from Voronezh Oblast, 3,384 from Dnepropetrovsk Oblast, 3,162 from Gorkiy Oblast, 2,233 from the Crimea (not including those evacuated in the summer of 1941 to Stavropol Kray), and the remainder from other oblasts. In 1945-1948,

another 120,192 Germans were sent for special settlement (basically those repatriated from Germany and Austria, as well as a portion of those mobilized in 1942-1944 into the "worker columns" ("labor army") but who had not been subjected to expulsion and picked up in 1945-1946 for registration with the special settlements) [10].

During 1943-1944, the same lamentable fate befell the Kalmyks, Chechens, Ingush, Karachai, Balkars, the Crimean Tatars, the Bulgarians, Greeks and Armenians. In 1944, the Meshetian Turks, Kurds, Khemshils and Azerbaijani were expelled from Georgia. Representatives of other nationalities were partially expelled along with the designated peoples [11]. At the moment of arrival for special settlement, there were registered 608,749 persons expelled from the Northern Caucasus (362,282 Chechens, 134,178 Ingush, 68,327 Karachai, 37,406 Balkars and 6,556 other), 228,392 from the Crimea (including 183,155 Crimean Tatars), 94,955 from Georgia and 91,919 Kalmyks. Prior to 1 October 1948, some 32,981 Northern Caucasians and 979 Kalmyks were excluded from this number as double counted at the moment of the initial migration (consequently, 575,768 Northern Caucasians and 90,940 Kalmyks were sent for special settlement) [12].

Mass expulsion of persons with their sending for special settlement was widely practiced at the end of the war and in the first postwar years, particularly from the Baltic and the Western Ukraine. In the summer of 1945, work was carried out to transfer the Koreans to the status of special settlers (around 120,000 persons) and expelled in 1937 from the Far East to Central Asia and Kazakhstan, but after the surrender of Japan this was halted and the Koreans thus did not become special settlers (they were administratively exiled). The Ingermanlands and Finns expelled in 1942 from Leningrad and its surroundings under a compulsory evacuation in 1942-1945 were special settlers but upon the order of the USSR NKVD [People's Commissariat of Internal Affairs] of 28 January 1946, they were removed from registration with the special settlements. After this they were registered after the fact as administratively expelled in accord with the Ukase of the Presidium of the USSR Supreme Soviet of 22 June 1941 (as a "socially dangerous element" expelled from oblasts which were declared under marshal law) [14].

The end of the 1940s was characterized by a maximum hardening of conditions vis-a-vis the special settlers. On 26 November 1948, the Presidium of the USSR Supreme Soviet approved the Ukase "On Criminal Liability for Flight From Places of Compulsory and Permanent Settlement of Persons Expelled to Remote Regions of the Soviet Union During the Period of the Patriotic War" [15]. This Ukase established that those expelled during the war for special settlement were to remain in perpetuity in this status; for fleeing the place of obligatory settlement they were to be given a punishment of 20 years of forced labor. Moreover, according to the Ukase, persons guilty of providing shelter for those fleeing from

places of compulsory settlement or contributing to their flight, persons guilty of issuing permission to expellees for returning to places of former residence and persons who provided help in settling them in the places of former residence were to be held criminally liable and punished by prison for 5 years.

Here is an excerpt from the "Instructions for the Commandants of the Special MVD [Ministry of Internal Affairs] Special Commandant Offices for Work Among the Exiles and Special Settlers" which came into force in June 1949: "11. The Germans, Karachai, Chechens, Ingush, Balkars, Kalmyks, Crimean Tatars, Crimean Greeks, Crimean Bulgarians and Crimean Armenians, the Turks, Kurds and Khemshils who are in special settlement as well as those exiled from the Baltic (Latvians, Estonians and Lithuanians expelled in 1949) are 'exiles.'

"In accord with the Ukase of the Presidium of the USSR Supreme Soviet of 26 November 1948, these exiles:

"a) Are to be transferred to special settlement in perpetuity, without the right to return to their former places of residence;

"b) For unauthorized departure (flight) from the places of compulsory settlement of these emigres, the measure of punishment has been set at 20 years of forced labor.

"12. Other contingents which are also on special settlement such as members of the OUN [Association of Ukrainian Nationalists], Vlasovites, the members of the families of the leaders and active bandits from Lithuania, the 'ukazniki' [persons sentenced under the Ukase of 2 June 1948] and other persons who were in special settlement were 'special settlers.'

"In the event of fleeing from their place of settlement, the special settlers were to be held liable under criminal procedures according to Part 2 of Article 82 of the RSFSR Criminal Code and the corresponding articles of the criminal codes of the other Union republics. The Ukase of the Presidium of the USSR Supreme Soviet of 26 November 1948 is not to be extended to them" [16].

Statements were taken from the emigres with the following content: "Statement. I, the exile..., living in..., have been informed of the Ukase of the Presidium of the USSR Supreme Soviet of 26 November 1948 that I have been exiled to special settlement in perpetuity without the right to return to the place of former residence and for unauthorized departure (flight) from the place of compulsory settlement will be condemned to 20 years of forced labor" [17]. Then came the signatures of the exile and the co-worker from the MVD bodies who took the statement.

As of 1 January 1949, registered were 2,300,223 special settlers, including 1,835,078 persons categorized as exiled in perpetuity (365,173 Chechens and Ingush, 57,491 Karachai, 31,873 Balkars, 77,279 Kalmyks, 186,535 exiles from the Crimea, 1,035,701 Germans and

81,026 expelled in 1944 from Georgia) and 465,145 persons exiled for certain periods (96,191 OUN members [18], 3,119 Volksdeutsche, 2,730 "German supporters" [19], 1,129 "truly Orthodox Christians" [IPKh] [20], 46,940 persons exiled in 1945-1948 from Lithuania, 21,124 exiled under the Ukase of 2 June 1948 [21], 135,319 Vlasovites [22], 28,130 Poles [23] and 130,463 former kulaks [24]).

Geography of Settlement of 2,300,223 Special Settlers (as of 1 January 1949)

Kazakhstan: 820,165 (393,537 Germans, 302,526 Chechens and Ingush, 33,088 Karachai, 29,497 from Georgia, 28,130 Poles, 17,512 Balkars, 7,513 OUN members, 5,466 from the Crimea, 2,042 Kalmyks and 854 Vlasovites).

Uzbekistan: 177,099 (118,488 from the Crimea, 42,618 from Georgia, 6,699 former kulaks, 6,518 Germans, 1,569 Vlasovites, 714 Kalmyks, 429 Karachai and 64 Chechens and Ingush).

Kemerovo Oblast: 153,674 (49,467 Germans, 47,595 former kulaks, 28,919 OUN members, 19,673 Vlasovites, 5,415 from the Crimea, 2,458 under the Ukase of 2 June 1948, 87 from Lithuania and 40 Kalmyks).

Kirghizia: 128,727 (62,583 Chechens and Ingush, 23,974 Karachai, 14,954 Germans, 14,361 Balkars, 8,911 from Georgia, 2,974 Vlasovites, 827 from the Crimea and 143 Kalmyks).

Krasnoyarsk Kray: 108,070 (56,184 Germans, 23,233 from Lithuania, 16,407 Kalmyks, 6,233 Vlasovites, 5,385 OUN members, 397 under the Ukase of 2 June 1948, and 231 IPKh).

Altay Kray: 105,482 (86,709 Germans, 17,993 Kalmyks and 780 former kulaks).

Novosibirsk Oblast: 92,041 (70,729 Germans, 17,026 Kalmyks, 3,119 Volksdeutsche, 593 German supporters, 330 Vlasovites and 244 OUN members).

Molotov Oblast: 84,749 (39,909 Germans, 15,948 from the Crimea, 15,355 Vlasovites, 10,492 OUN members, 2,324 from Lithuania and 721 under the Ukase of 2 June 1948).

Tomsk Oblast: 67,148 (41,702 former kulaks, 21,085 Germans, 2,492 from Lithuania, 1,020 Kalmyks, 444 IPKh, 324 Vlasovites and 81 OUN members).

Sverdlovsk Oblast: 61,281 (45,587 Germans, 12,532 from the Crimea, 1,343 from Lithuania, 1,256 Vlasovites, 507 Kalmyks and 56 OUN members).

Omsk Oblast: 61,272 (38,182 Germans, 13,358 OUN members and 9,732 Kalmyks).

Tyumen Oblast: 53,522 (24,228 Germans, 14,460 former kulaks, 9,596 Kalmyks, 3,342 under the Ukase of 2 June 1948, 1,227 from Lithuania, 554 IPKh and 215 OUN members).

Chelyabinsk Oblast: 45,238 (38,440 Germans, 6,398 OUN members and 400 Vlasovites).

Irkutsk Oblast: 36,853 (11,383 from Lithuania, 8,378 OUN members, 8,064 Vlasovites, 4,771 under the Ukase of 2 June 1948 and 4,257 Germans).

Komi ASSR: 31,315 (11,042 Germans, 8,219 Vlasovites, 7,102 former kulaks, 4,088 OUN members and 864 from Lithuania).

Tajikistan: 30,630 (18,184 Germans, 5,772 Vlasovites, 4,537 from the Crimea and 2,137 German supporters).

Dalstroy [Main Construction Administration of the Far North] (Magadan): 29,845 (28,366 Vlasovites and 1,479 Germans).

Tula Oblast: 18,440 (13,202 Germans, 3,446 from the Crimea and 1,792 Vlasovites).

Bashkir ASSR: 18,332 (11,548 Germans, 4,521 from the Crimea and 2,263 Vlasovites).

Arkhangelsk Oblast: 16,869 (11,375 Germans, 4,506 OUN members and 988 Vlasovites).

Khabarovsk Kray: 15,086 (7,718 former kulaks, 2,692 Vlasovites, 1,674 Germans and 2,002 under the Ukase of 2 June 1948).

Chkalov Oblast: 11,879 (Germans).

Mari ASSR: 10,478 (8,013 from the Crimea and 2,465 Germans).

Yakut ASSR: 10,401 (4,048 Vlasovites, 3,273 under the Ukase of 2 June 1948, 2,380 Germans and 700 OUN members).

Vologda Oblast: 10,363 (9,520 Germans and 843 OUN members).

Kostroma Oblast: 9,219 (6,669 Germans and 2,550 from the Crimea).

Udmurt ASSR: 9,183 (7,744 Germans and 1,439 OUN members).

Kirov Oblast: 8,779 (6,311 Germans, 1,948 OUN members, 465 from the Crimea and 55 Vlasovites).

Buryat-Mongol ASSR: 8,470 (3,987 from Lithuania, 2,341 Germans and 2,142 Vlasovites).

Moscow Oblast: 8,402 (7,142 Germans and 1,260 from the Crimea)

Amur Oblast: 8,387 (3,185 Vlasovites, 1,773 under the Ukase of 2 June 1948, 1,717 former kulaks, 1,605 Germans and 107 OUN members).

Karelo-Finnish ASSR: 7,564 (5,925 Vlasovites and 1,639 under the Ukase of 2 June 1948).

Kuybyshev Oblast: 5,895 (5,297 Germans and 598 from the Crimea).

Chita Oblast: 5,126 (2,369 Vlasovites, 1,521 OUN members, 748 under the Ukase of 2 June 1948 and 488 Germans).

Gorkiy Oblast: 4,946 (1,853 from the Crimea, 1,651 Germans and 1,442 Vlasovites).

Sakhalin Oblast: 3,904 (2,059 Kalmyks, 1,218 Vlasovites and 627 Germans).

Murmansk Oblast: 3,387 (2,094 former kulaks and 1,793 Vlasovites).

Turkmenia: 3,797 (2,521 Germans and 1,276 Vlasovites).

Primorskiy Kray: 3,676 (Vlasovites).

Ivanovo Oblast: 2,373 (1,982 Germans and 391 from the Crimea).

Tatar ASSR: 2,180 (1,284 Germans, 726 Vlasovites and 170 from the Crimea).

Dnepropetrovsk Oblast: 1,806 (Germans).

Ryazan Oblast: 1,442 (Germans).

Ulyanovsk Oblast: 668 (Germans).

Kurgan Oblast: 606 (389 Germans and 217 former kulaks).

Kherson Oblast: 379 (former kulaks).

Tuva Autonomous Oblast: 320 (Vlasovites).

Chuvash ASSR: 255 (200 Germans and 55 from the Crimea) [25].

By mid-1949, the ranks of the special settlers were being filled out with new contingents and primarily exiles from the Baltic, Moldavia and from the Black Sea Coast [26]. They were put in the category of exiles in perpetuity. In the composition of special settlers there was a steady increase in the proportional amount of persons exiled in perpetuity and a respective decline in those exiled for specific periods. On 1 January 1949, there were 79.8 percent of the former and 20.2 percent of the latter; on 15 July of the same year, the figures, respectively, were 82 percent and 18 percent. The number of contingents of special settlers registered with the Special Settlements Department of the USSR MVD over the first half of 1949 increased from 14 to 17.

In the history of special settlement the years 1948-1949 were turning points in the sense that it was precisely in this period that the birthrate became higher than the death rate. In truth, such a change had already occurred in 1935 when in the "kulak exile" the birthrate for the first time surpassed the death rate (26,122 were born and 22,173 died) (see Table 2).

Practice has shown that with rare exception, for any contingent the birthrate surpassed the death rate in no less than 5 years of residence in special settlement. For example, among the Germans the basic mass of which went into special settlement from 1941, the birthrate in 1948-1949, was already double that of the death rate. For those who had been in special settlement for less than 5 years (primarily the OUN members and residents of the Baltic republics), on the contrary, the death rate surpassed the birthrate by several-fold. Among the Kalmyks, Northern Caucasians, Crimean and Georgian contingents, the birthrate in 1948 was still significantly less than the death rate but in 1949, surpassed it (see Table 9). As for the former kulaks, for them the exceeding of the death rate over the birthrate in 1948-1949 is to be explained by the fact that in 1941-1948 there was a mass release basically of persons of child-bearing ages while among those adults left in special settlement the middle-aged and elderly prevailed sharply. Among other "old residents," the Poles, the sex-age composition of which could be termed normal, the birthrate in 1948-1949 was higher than the death rate by almost 2.3-fold. For such a contingent as the Vlasovites which were made up of almost completely males with a very high death rate, a birthrate was naturally completely lacking.

Table 9: Birth and Death Rate Among Special Settlers Who Were Kalmyks, From the Northern Caucasus, Crimea and Georgia (1948-1949) [29]

Contingents	1948		1949	
	Born	Died	Born	Died
From Northern Caucasus	10,348	15,182	13,831	10,252
From Crimea	1,753	3,918	3,586	2,120
From Georgia	1,220	2,389	1,800	1,655
Kalmyks	1,135	2,766	2,058	1,903
TOTAL:	14,456	24,255	21,275	15,930

In March 1949, among the 1,489,549 adult special settlers (without the 786,351 children under the age of 16 inclusively), there were 722,361 workers, 432,711 kolkhoz members, 851 individual farmers, 62,240 white collar personnel, 16,799 students, 19,493 nonworking, 78,329 housewives, 63,441 elderly and dependents, 41,053 disabled, 3,092 pensioners and 49,179 other. For the contingents one can observe a broad spread in the

ratio of the designated socioprofessional groups. Thus, the proportional amount of workers in all the adult special settlers averaged 48.5 percent, but for the contingents it varied from 11.8 percent among those exiled in 1944 from Georgia up to 94.6 percent among the Vlasovites [30]. The special settlers from a majority of the contingents had relative freedom of choice in the type of

occupation (with a number of exceptions to this rule) while the Vlasovites by directive were sent to projects in construction and industry where naturally virtually all of them became "workers."

The educational level of the special settlers emerged in the following manner (see Table 10).

Table 10: Educational Level of Adult Special Settlers (17 Years and Older). March 1949 [31]

Contingents	Higher	Secondary	Lower	Illiterate
Germans	5,875	34,537	576,928	76,866
From Northern Caucasus	577	5,466	95,103	151,523
From Crimea	873	7,645	88,812	27,119
Kalmyks	201	1,367	28,020	19,060
From Georgia in 1944	63	957	15,255	27,489
OUN members	100	1,050	46,141	15,463
Vlasovites	858	9,190	98,743	4,091
From Lithuania in 1945-1948	265	1,596	22,583	7,348
Under Ukase of 2 June 1948	24	653	17,898	2,277
Volksdeutsche	40	276	1,615	439
German supporters	59	297	1,817	457
IPKh	—	6	309	289
Former kulaks	45	1,516	49,466	20,190
Poles	21	457	14,457	6,068
TOTAL:	9,001	65,013	1,057,147	358,388

Thus, in March 1949, among the adult special settlers there were 0.6 percent with a higher education, 4.3 with a secondary, 71.0 percent with a lower and 24.1 percent illiterate. The co-workers at the Department of Special Settlements of the MVD and its divisions on the spot established the educational level of the special settlers for their own internal use and they had no need to be cunning on this question. For this reason, they dispassionately recorded that among the adult population of the peoples deported in 1944 from Georgia (the Meskhethian Turks, Kurds, Khemshils and Azerbaijanis), 62 percent were illiterate, from the Northern Caucasus (Chechens, Ingush, Karachai and Balkars) 59.9 percent, among the exiles from the Crimea 21.8 percent, among the Kalmyks 39.2 percent, among the Germans 11.1 percent and so forth. These indicators diverge substantially with the data of the 1939 All-Union Population Census, where an improbably high educational level is shown for the USSR population and this, of course, was a falsification.

In March 1949, in the special settlements there were 156,843 persons who at various times had served in the Red (Soviet) Army (Table 11).

Table 11: Number of Special Settlers Who Previously Served in Red (Soviet) Army (According to Data on March 1949) [32]

Contingents	First Officers	Sergeants	Rank-and-File
Germans	1,609	4,282	27,724
From Northern Caucasus	710	1,696	6,488
From Crimea	569	1,660	8,665
From Georgia in 1944	57	459	3,559
Kalmyks	383	1,118	4,633
Under Ukase of 2 June 1948	132	1,128	4,736
From Lithuania in 1945-1948	5	5	210
Former kulaks	23	122	1,528
Vlasovites	2,433	9,558	71,606
OUN members	1	28	503
Volksdeutsche	3	22	41
German supporters	6	27	187
IPKh	—	—	1
Poles	12	104	810
TOTAL:	5,943	20,209	130,691

In Table 12, we give information on the presence among the special settlers of persons who had been prisoners and overseas as well as persons with previous convictions. As a consequence of the terrible Ukase of 26 November 1948, there was a sharp decline in the number of escapes. While in 1948, 6,863 special settlers fled, in 1949, the number was 1,723 or almost 4-fold less than in 1948. In a majority of instances, the escapes ended unsuccessfully. Of the 85,985 special settlers who escaped in 1941-1949, prior to 1 January 1950, 78,620 persons had been apprehended. Among the 8,698 special settlers who were wanted on 1 October 1949, 2,544 were Germans, 1,584 OUN members, 1,306 were exiles from the Crimea in 1944, 1,285 Vlasovites, 1,033 Northern Caucasians, 369 exiles from Lithuania in 1945-1948, 211 exiles from Georgia in 1944, 107 exiles under Ukase of 2 June 1948, 98 Kalmyks, 71 Volksdeutsche, 24 who had been exiled in 1949 from the Baltic, 18 persons who had been exiled in 1949 from Moldavia, 16 persons exiled in 1949 from the Black Sea Coast, 16 IPKh and 16 Poles. The special settlers who had fled from the contingent of "former kulaks" by this time were no longer wanted. Over the 18 months (January 1949-June 1950), some 2,776 "exiles" were sentenced to 20 years of forced labor for escaping [34].

Table 12: Number of Persons With Previous Convictions, Who Had Been a Prisoner and Overseas Among the Special Settlers (According to Data on March 1949) [33]

Contingents	Prisoners	Overseas	Previously Convicted
Germans	2,789	118,094	30,186
From Northern Caucasus	1,004	1,345	5,383
From Crimea	3,992	6,148	2,998
Kalmyks	1,531	721	1,035
From Georgia in 1944	479	557	305
OUN members	114	2,092	2,124
Vlasovites	70,042	93,187	5,802
From Lithuania in 1945-1948	49	488	307
Under Ukase of 2 June 1948	960	2,145	2,057
Volksdeutsche	7	596	1,423
German supporters	160	303	73
IPKh	7	1	42
Former kulaks	189	220	4,243
Poles	43	141	700
TOTAL:	90,366	226,038	56,678

With rare exception, during the "resettlement of peoples" the party and Komsomol cells were kept and the

deported kept their membership in the VKP(b) [All-Union Communist Party (Bolshevik)] and the Komsomol. In March 1949, among the special settlers there were 7,659 communists registered in the local party bodies, including 2,869 Germans, 2,128 persons exiled in 1943-1944 from the Northern Caucasus (1,003 Chechens, 393 Karachai, 357 Balkars, 337 Ingush and 38 other), 1,301 Kalmyks, 776 persons exiled in 1944 from the Crimea (742 Tatars, 8 Greeks, 8 Bulgarians, 8 Armenians and 10 other), 535 persons exiled in 1944 from Georgia (278 Turks, 25 Kurds, 4 Khemshils, 228 Azerbaijani), 42 Poles and 8 from the contingent of "former kulaks." There was not a single communists among the special settlers who had been OUN members, Vlasovites, persons exiled in 1945-1948 from Lithuania or under the Ukase of 2 June 1948, the Volksdeutsche, the German supporters or the IPKh.

In March 1949, among the special settlers, there were 11,669 Komsomol members (they were in all contingents without exception). Among the Komsomol members were 5,800 Germans, 1,896 from the Northern Caucasus (873 Chechens, 420 Karachai, 369 Balkars, 198 Ingush and 36 other), 1,580 from the Crimea (1,225 Tatars, 117 Bulgarians, 90 Greeks, 81 Armenians and 67 other), 764 Kalmyk, 607 from Georgia (329 Turks, 67 Kurds, 10 Khemshils, 201 Azerbaijani and others), 552 from the contingent "former kulaks," 358 Poles, 32 OUN members, 29 German supporters, 25 Volksdeutsche, 9 Vlasovites, 7 Lithuanians, 5 under the Ukase of 2 June 1948 and 5 IPKh [35].

Regardless of the fact that over 200,000 persons (from the contingents of "former kulaks," "Vlasovites" and certain others) were released from special settlement in 1949-1952, the number of special settlers by 1 January 1953 had risen to 2,753,356 persons. This was the maximum number on a given date over the entire history of special settlement. The increase was primarily due to the dispatch in 1949-1952 to special settlement of new contingents including the peasants dispossessed and exiled from the Baltic, the Western Ukraine, Western Belorussia and the Right Bank Moldavia; the Anders followers (the former servicemen of the Anders Polish Army with their families); Iranians, Assyrians and other "unreliable" persons exiled in 1950-1952 from Georgia; Jehovah's Witnesses; the former Basmacks with their families exiled in 1950 from Tajikistan; persons exiled under the Ukase of the Presidium of the USSR Supreme Soviet of 23 July 1951 (for vagrancy and begging) and so forth. Over 100,000 Germans who had not previously been exiled and who were local inhabitants of the Urals, Siberia, Far East, Kazakhstan, Central Asia and certain other regions were registered for special settlements at the place of their permanent residence. The dispatch of repatriated Germans to special settlement did not stop. There was continuing deportation of the OUN members, under the Ukase of 2 June 1948 and others. The number of special settlers was also increased by the conversion at the beginning of the 1950s to the status of special settlers of a portion of the exiles, the exiled settlers and administratively exiled (the "anti-Soviet element" deported in

1940-1941 from the Baltic, Western Belorussia, Western Ukraine and Right Bank Moldavia; the persons who "did not inspire confidence" exiled in 1937 from the Ukrainian and Afghan borders; the "socially dangerous element" of predominantly Greeks) and exiled in 1942 from Krasnodar Kray and Rostov Oblast and others. The natural increase also served as a source of additional settlers. Thus, in 1950, this was 28,487 persons (62,001 were born in special settlement and 33,514 died) [36].

Bibliography

1. TsGAOR SSSR. Central State Archives of the October Revolution, the Superior State Governing and Administrative Bodies of the USSR. Collection of Documents.
2. Ibid. The dispossessed kulaks were divided into three categories: 1) those remanded to the court; 2) exiled with dispatch to special settlement; 3) those exiled without being sent to special settlement. The given table shows only the dispossessed kulaks in the second category and the families remanded to the court.
3. Ibid.
4. Ibid.
5. Ibid.
6. Ibid.
7. Ibid.
8. Ibid.
9. Ibid. The result of Table 4 does not coincide with the grand total of Table 5 by some 23 persons.
10. Ibid.
11. According to the data for March 1949, among the special settlers from the Northern Caucasus, in addition to the Chechens, Ingush, Karachai and Balkars, there were also 3,219 others (1,617 Kabardins, 485 Kumyks, 311 Avar, 235 Dagestani, 186 Tavli, 52 Abaza, 49 Ossetians, 41 Nogai, 35 Russians, 34 Dargin and 174 other); among those exiled from the Crimea, in addition to the Tatars, Bulgarians, Greeks and Armenians, there were 3,628 other (1,280 Russians, 1,109 gypsies, 427 Germans, 272 Turks, 257 Ukrainians and 283 other); among the Germans were 1,721 others (662 Russians, 355 Ukrainians, 124 Poles, 11 Lithuanians, 104 Latvians, 58 Finns, 34 Austrians, 33 Estonians and 240 other).
12. TsGAOR SSSR. Collection of Documents.
13. Ibid.
14. Ibid.
15. Ibid.
16. Ibid.
17. Ibid.
18. Abbreviation of the Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists (OUN). The deporting of the OUN members (real and imaginary) with their families from the Western Ukraine occurred in 1944-1952. Under the Ukase of the Presidium of the USSR Supreme Soviet of 6 April 1950, they were also to be covered by the Ukase of 26 November 1948.
19. In special settlement were not the actual Volksdeutsche and the German supporters but the members of their family. Upon completion of their term of imprisonment in camps and prisons, the Volksdeutsche and the German supporters were sent to their families in special settlement.
20. Members of the religious sect "Truly Orthodox Christians" (IPKh) with their families exiled in 1944 from Ryazan, Orel and Voronezh Oblasts.
21. According to the Ukase of the Presidium of the USSR Supreme Soviet of 2 June 1948, kolhoz members were to be exiled for 8 years for the failure to work the required minimum of work days.
22. In 1946-1947, 148,079 Vlasovites were sent to special settlement (prior to this they had been kept in the testing and screening camps of the NKVD). These persons were informed that they merited the harshest punishment, but because of the victory over Germany the Soviet government was showing leniency toward them, having freed them from criminal liability for betraying the country and limiting itself to sending them to special settlement for a period of 6 years. In addition to those who had served (as a rule, as rank-and-file) in the armies of Nazi Germany and its allies, traitor troop formations, police, bodies of the occupation administration and so forth, the contingent of Vlasovites also included a portion of the Soviet officers who had spent time in Nazi prisons and for whom, punishment in the form of special settlement was established for the very fact of being taken prisoner alive. A majority of the Lithuanians, Latvians and Estonians who were mobilized into the German Army as rank-and-file and junior command personnel as well as the Moldavians who served in the Antonescu Romanian Army were released from being sent to special settlement and prior to the end of 1945 were permitted to go home. In 1951-1952, 93,446 special settlers were freed from the contingent of the Vlasovites upon serving their 6-year period of special settlement.
23. The Poles had been exiled in 1936 from the zone bordering on Poland. Up to October 1947, they had been included in the contingent "former kulaks" and then released but in 1948, they were again registered in the special settlements. They did not have any relation to the contingent of "Polish settlers and refugees" which existed in 1940-1941.
24. The basic mass of the peasants dispossessed and exiled in 1929-1933 was subsequently released from the special settlements. Just in 1941-1948, some 810,614 special settlers from the contingent of "former kulaks" were released. TsGAOR SSSR.

25. TsGAOR SSSR. Collection of Documents.

26. In 1949, there was the exiling of the "unreliable element" of the Greeks, the Dashnaks, Turks and certain others from Georgia, Azerbaijan, Armenia, from the Black Sea Coast, Northern Caucasus and Crimea. In the reports of the Department of Special Settlements of the USSR MVD this contingent was conditionally called "From the Black Sea Coast." (Naturally, this term greatly restricted the geography of the deportation carried out.)

27. TsGAOR SSSR. Collection of Documents.

28. Ibid.

29. Ibid.

30. Ibid.

31. Ibid.

32. Ibid.

33. Ibid.

34. Ibid.

35. Ibid.

36. Ibid.

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Reflections on the Subject and Prospects of Sociology

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[Article by Mikhail Sergeyevich Komarov, doctor of philosophical sciences, professor and prorector at the Yaroslav Pedagogical Institute. He has been repeatedly published in our journal]

[Text] It seems to me that in the course of the debate which has newly broken out on the subject of sociological science, a number of very important questions has remained in the shadows and, in particular, that of the relationship of sociology and politics. This by no means simple question in former years was resolved in a standard manner: the class, ideological and political functions of our society were presented as established once and for all. Our science was subjected to violent politization and ideologization, and frequently this was done under the guise of the supposed advantage of Marxist-Leninist sociology over bourgeois which was supposedly concealing its true class make-up. The result of this "socialist" engagement is now well known as we have been forced to admit that a significant portion of the previously conducted research, particularly in the area of studying the socialist way of life, the socioclass structure and a number of others had lost their scientific truth due

to their normative nature and their inherent orientation on the dogmatic provisions of scientific communism and the party documents from the period of stagnation.

It is natural for this reason to pose the question of just how suitable is the former rote interpretation of relations between sociology and politics for the current, rapidly changing sociopolitical situation in the nation, when pluralism is becoming a daily standard in social life and awareness. We are all concerned by the question of what new appearance sociology should assume under the conditions of a democratic society as we now make our way with difficulty along the path of building such a society, in transforming the relationship of the economy, politics and ideology, separating civil society from the state and abandoning the hegemony of the CPSU. In this context the questions arise: What variations of relationships between sociology and politics are generally possible, to what degree does one or another interpretation of the subject of sociology influence its sociopolitical orientations, and is it possible to separate the position of a sociologist as a scientist from his position as a citizen?

As we are intending to develop in the channel of world sociology, the opportunity and even the necessity arise of considering the experience of the West.

Regardless of the fact that in Western sociology the thesis of "freedom from values" up to the present has remained one of the cornerstones, it has never gained universal support. This was the case even in the prewar years, in the period of the intense flourishing of empirical and applied sociology. The question of who is served by sociology (or as it was precisely formulated at that time by R. Lind "sociology for whom?") has not ceased to concern the progressively thinking scientists since then.

In the 1960s and 1970s the problem of the relationship of sociology and politics assumed particular importance in the West. As a definite theoretical response to the crisis situation in the social sciences, a concept was formed of a polyvariance of sociopolitical orientations in sociology caused by the various interpretations of its subject and method.

One of the first attempts in describing the various types of relationship between politics and sociology belongs to the well-known American sociologist E. Shils. Subsequently, this concept was repeatedly clarified and modified. In an article under the characteristic title "The Calling of Sociology," E. Shils isolates the three underlying types of relationships between sociology and power. The first of the "manipulative" and is characterized by collaboration with the powers, that is, sociological knowledge is employed for the purposes of controlling social processes and manipulating conduct. The second "critical" type of political orientation occurs when the sociologists reject collaboration with the authorities and hold an analytical position vis-a-vis the policy being carried out in society. The third "conciliatory" type of orientation is linked by E. Shils with the

humanistic function of sociology the essence of which consists in "using sociology as a part of the process of transforming the relations of power and the subject by improving relations between people and forming a feeling of closeness" [1, pp 1436-1440].

Subsequent debates made it possible to describe in greater detail the sociopolitical orientations and more accurately define their deep-seated link with the three leading currents of Western sociology: natural scientific which its opponents at times not very correctly term "positivistic," "critical" sociology and the "understanding" (humanistic) concept. Let us examine in greater detail in what manner in the basic paradigms of Western European and American sociological thought, the linkage of the political focus is manifested with the interpretation inherent to the given direction of the subject and method of sociology.

The first of the political orientations described by E. Shils to a greater measure is inherent to the prevailing direction of Western sociology based on a natural scientific methodology. Here society is usually viewed as a system of social relations and this system consists of subsystems, social structures, institutions, organizations and groups. Methods are employed from the arsenal of modern scientific knowledge: system-structural and evolutionist approaches in theoretical sociology, mathematical and statistical methods in empirical. The sources of this direction are rooted in the methodology of E. Durkheim who proposed that social facts be viewed as "things" [2, p 4]. The objectivism and ethical neutrality inherent to the representatives of this school in assessing the obtained results derive from the designated methodological view. However, regardless of the adherence of the supporters to the ideals of pure science, here there are strong grounds to feel that the given type of sociological knowledge, together with the natural scientific methodology, has been transposed to the area of social cognition and the technocratic orientation inherent to the latter of "reworking" and altering nature. The political orientation of this type of sociological knowledge is clearly apparent in the applied research involved with the elaboration of "social engineering," that is, with the study of social phenomena and processes for forming optimum management decisions. In the area of theoretical sociology oriented to a natural scientific methodology, the linkage with practice has a more mediated character and this has given rise to at times a fierce debate between the supporters and opponents of the given view.

If we now turn to the two other influential sociological schools, then here as well we can trace a definite relationship between a specific interpretation of the subject and method of sociology, on the one hand, and its political orientation, on the other. Here the representatives of these schools openly, as a rule, state their political sympathies and antipathies and support of certain social ideals. This has frequently served as grounds for the supporters of the Durkheim tradition to accuse them of abandoning scientific objectivity. The

defenders of "critical" and "understanding" sociology speak about the inapplicability of the natural scientific methodology in social understanding as this, in their opinion, ignores the specific features of the phenomena being studied and in particular the moral aspects of the relationship between the subject and object of cognition. Such a viewpoint of the subject of sociology inevitably presupposes a definite value position which, for example, in the case of "critical" sociology is linked to attempts to reform social relations for overcoming alienation and freeing man from the repressive burden of existing social structures. Its supporters, in appealing to the Marxist criticism of bourgeois society, emphasized the importance of a sociophilosophical dialectical analysis of social reality in all its integralness and contradictoriness. This approach in the modern variations of "critical" sociology is combined with the method of hermeneutics. In American publications there is a more noticeable influence of empirical sociology represented by the "involved observation," "the description of individual cases" and so forth. This was tested out successfully for the first time by the Chicago School which had a clear liberal-critical, reformist orientation.

The "understanding" concept in Western sociology focuses attention on studying the subjective aspect of social phenomena. In viewing social reality as derivative from individual human activity, its supporters endeavor to understand the inner meaning of social reality and this ultimately should help to improve social relations, to establish correct communications and to improve mutual understanding between the various social groups. Characteristically, the concepts employed in the research are viewed not as an instrument for reflecting reality or for systematizing empirical data but rather as "feeling concepts," in the terminology of the prominent representative of symbolic interactionism H. Blumer [3, p 686]. In other words, the conceptual apparatus serves to sharpen our understanding and fathoming of reality, in listening to what is occurring. Along with modified methods of intuitive perception and the interpretation of action (symbolic interactionism), particular methods of experiment and observation (ethnomethodology) are also employed as specific research methods.

Let me voice a number of general considerations on the possibility of the development of the designated forms of sociological knowledge in our country, naturally considering its specific features. First of all, we must recognize such a possibility because ideological and theoretical pluralism, on the one hand, would reflect the complexity and diversity of the existing social phenomena and, on the other, the process of a deepening democratization of society whereby it is completely possible to have the creation of alternative types of sociological knowledge capable of accumulating ideological orientations as these form in the various strata of civil society. Secondly, let us take into account the fact that the "humanistic" and "critical" models of sociological research which are so uncustomary for us would fit rather closely to the cultural tradition of Marxism although their modern versions have a different conceptual and research nature.

The experience of Polish sociology could be of definite practical interest for us as this has consciously maintained and supported the traditions of humanistic sociology of F. Znaniecki and in addition has assimilated many positive aspects of modern radical-critical Western sociology. Thirdly, the assimilating of the traditions of "critical" and "humanistic" sociology is extremely important for forming an adequate assessment of the empirical-analytical models of sociology which prevail in our country. This would serve as an effective counter to their absolutizing which, unfortunately, is observed in our country.

Let us point out one circumstance which lies outside the scientific area. Since the socioeconomic prospects for our nation's development are tied to a deepening of the economic reform along the path of a controlled market, it is quite probable that the applied focus in domestic sociology will not only survive but also grow stronger. However, the officially proclaimed slogan of building a humane, democratic socialism in the USSR obliges the sociologists to pay closest attention to the humanistic aspects of the changes being carried out in the nation. Here, obviously, there must be not only a definite reorientation in the sociological research in the sense of the themes and research procedures but also, what is very uncustomary for us, a conscious forming of a critical mind set toward the existing official institutions and structures. For this reason, one of the important tasks confronting our sociologists I would call an imperative need to reanalyze their place and role in the new democratic renewing society and the development of a critical reflexive mind set in terms of oneself and one's own discipline.

Sociology should not only focus its efforts on an analysis of the subjects of historical action and the active forces of perestroika, as V.A. Yadov called for [4], but also become an implement in the enlightenment and education of broad strata of the population, an instrument for the understanding of society and man as this is extremely important under present-day conditions. Social conscience, as is known, does not tolerate a vacuum, the need of society for self-understanding is constant but for now this natural need is met only by sociopolitical writing. But this cannot and should not replace a concrete scientific knowledge dealing with society.

Is our sociology ready to carry out this task? It is rather obvious that in its present state it is not. Radical measures are required to restructure the system of sociological knowledge, and there must be a substantial modification of the conceptual means and ideological procedures. This cannot be carried out without the intense involvement of it in the process of development of world sociology.

Just how much the language of description and explanation of social phenomena, as is inherent in modern world sociology, differs from the conceptual means accepted in our theoretical sociology and which have largely a sociophilosophical origin, one has merely to turn to the

concept of "social relations" which certain specialists see as the main subject of sociology [5, pp 11-16]. Here prime importance is given to the socioeconomic impersonal relations and structures which determine the activities of classes, various social strata and groups. However, two fundamental aspects are overlooked here. In the first place, in the language of sociological analysis the system of social relations is adequately described by the concepts of the social role and social status, as people are primarily the concrete carriers of social relations in performing certain types of activity and correspondingly having a certain status in the social hierarchy. Roles and statuses are the initial social elements from which the basic forms of social relations are formed, that is, the various social groups, organizations and institutions. It is essential to understand and recognize that not social relations as such are the object of study of sociology (in society there is an infinite diversity of these), but rather the permanent forms of these relations or more accurately the typed or standardized aspects of social relations in which the fluid and changing social reality is as it were hardened. It is not the family or the production collective as such, not the "living" and concrete phenomena with their diverse and changing conditions and an atmosphere of human interaction which form the subject of a sociologist's study but rather a certain typical form of the family or a form of the production collective described by the universal language of social roles, statuses, standards, value orientations and so forth. In other words, the sociologist, in contrast to the writer or the poet, is interested not in the specific features and details of human existence but rather in their universal, typical and permanent forms.

The chief error made by Soviet sociologists is that the analysis of the nature and content of social relations which should be carried out in the categories of empirical science and which would include "motives and value orientations of the individual" and "status-role relations and normative complexes (institutions)," is replaced by the customary sociophilosophical analysis leading directly away from sociology. In clearly confusing the sociological and concrete scientific approach with the historical materialistic, the authors of the textbook "Marksistsko-leninskaya sotsiologiya" [Marxist-Leninist Sociology] persuasively state that "the nature and content of social relations can be correctly understood primarily on the basis of analyzing the position and role of one or another community (group) in the system of social production...." [6, pp 9-10].

The second crucial aspect which concerns the nature of social relations has led to the ignoring of the concept of culture by our sociologists. Usually overlooked is the fact that the system of the social interaction and intercourse of people is regulated by a certain range of "meanings," as has been accepted in modern sociology since the time of M. Weber. The latter is determined by the cultural standards prevailing in a society: by the system of knowledge, beliefs, by ideology, customs, traditions and so forth. For this reason, correct sociological analysis of

social relations should inevitably take into account three closely related and at the same time relatively independent levels: the individual—social system—culture. The task of sociological research is precisely to elucidate the mechanism of interaction between these three levels and above all on the borderline of the social and cultural systems, since the various institutionalized structures—from the family to the state and legal organizations—are engendered, survive and function in the corresponding key points of social relations. This, if you wish, is one of the most important "lessons of Western sociology," and without assimilating this it is impossible to speak of any serious headway in the development of the culture of sociological thought in our nation. For this reason, one of the ways for domestic sociology to escape from the blind alley into which it has been led by the applied focus and the ideological engagement, is seen by me in the "return of man to sociology." By this one should understand the obligatory psychological and cultural literacy of the professional sociologists and which now is often lacking in a majority of the researchers. This presupposes the necessity of a further profound elaboration of the sociological concept of the individual in its value and semantic breakdown.

An objectivistic and fetishistic interpretation of the nature of social relations and their obligatory reduction to the socioeconomic are not only a consequence of the deep-rooted habits of thinking in pat schemes, but also of the lack of professional sociological culture. For this reason, one of the main methodological tasks at present consists in fully assimilating the logic of the formation of sociology as a nonphilosophical science where the object of study is empirically recorded, typical and repeating images of human action and social interaction and not the abstractly constructed social relations and social spheres.

One of the most serious problems arising in defining the subject of sociology in the terms of social relations and social communities involves the place and role of institutional analysis in sociology. It remains unclear who will study the extremely important area for social cognition of social institutions (the economy, state, family, science, religion, education and so forth) as well as the various sorts of organizations, both formal and informal, understood certainly in sociological and not sociophilosophical terms. Both of these in their nature, structure and functions differ significantly from social communities (groups), as their activities are tied to the performing of fundamental needs of the social system and which define the system's integrity and stability. In the history of sociology, starting from A. Comte and H. Spencer, the study of social institutions has always been considered a most important task. Historical materialism to which, probably, this area remains, is capable of providing only a very general notion of the activities of various institutions within certain dichotomies (social conscience—social life, base—superstructure), in focusing attention chiefly on the historical transformations of the social institutions.

In the modern literature, there continues to survive a definite canon of sociological analysis and explanation and legitimized by the three-tiered model of Marxist-Leninist sociology which was popular during the years of stagnation and in which the role of a general sociological theory was ascribed to historical materialism and scientific communism. The relation to this or the simply rather arbitrary establishing of the relation between it and the studied phenomenon, be it a science, art or everyday life, were viewed as an unique standard of sociological explanation. The long domination of the three-tiered model of sociological knowledge, in essence, was an impediment in the development of sociology as an independent science dealing with society and led to the converting of it into an applied discipline and this was completely to the liking of the monopolist ideologists. As a result, for sociological research a role was prepared as an auxiliary, illustrative means for the known theoretical provisions of historical materialism and scientific communism or, as happened even more often, this was assigned to establish the formulations in the next party document.

The three-tiered model which denied sociology as a sovereign science has continued to thrive, although in a somewhat modified form. Precisely this is how we must view the new interpretations proposed for the subject of sociology by V.I. Ivanov and V.A. Yadov, although these authors supposedly favor its independence. The attempts made by them to provide a new interpretation of sociology by defining its subject in the terms of "social relations" or "social communities" merit sharp criticism precisely because with all the seeming external newness of the proposed interpretations of the subject and tasks of sociology, adherence to the old dogmas survives and this leads to an extremely unsatisfactory and palliative solution. While previously sociology and historical materialism were identical in their essential aspects and this in fact blocked the path to the independent development of sociological science, now a different variation has been proposed: sociology, in being to a certain degree an independent "problem oriented" discipline, has gained independence, but as a particular science along, for instance, with economics, political science, legal science and other social disciplines. But in actuality, with such an approach, historical materialism keeps the function of a general sociological theory while sociology is turned into one of the areas of its practical application and becomes an applied discipline. As a result, sociology remains without a society and society without a sociology.

In the disputes on the subject of sociology, we must not overlook the question of its institutionalization since, strictly speaking, we are unable to precisely state the gnoseological and social status of the science until the process of turning it into a mature, "normal," in the expression of T. Kuhn, science has been completed. Often this problem is reduced to the particular question, that is, to the absence of a system of sociological education and the training of skilled personnel, but in actuality

institutionalization is a more complex and diverse process and an analysis of this will help to better elucidate many questions.

In the sociology of science, the institutionalization of any scientific discipline is usually examined from two sides—inner and outer. From the inner viewpoint, institutionalization means improving the organizational structure of the science, the presence of a permanent division of labor within the discipline, the shaping of its professional ethos, and the elaboration of effective research procedures and methods. In its aggregate this should ensure an effective process of the production and systematization of knowledge in a certain area of cognition. The second, outer aspect of institutionalization assumes integration, active incorporation of the science into a system of social relations, and the assimilation by the scientific community of standards, values, ideals and demands of society.

Let us take a look as to how, from these positions, we should assess the situation in Soviet sociology. Among the criteria of the inner institutionalization, along with the professionalization and the genesis of the science's ethos, one of the most important places belongs to the division of labor, that is, to the presence of three relatively independent levels in the organizational structure of the science. The first is represented by fundamental scientific research the task of which is to add to scientific knowledge by constructing theories which would disclose the universal patterns and principles of the given area. The second level is the applied research in which the task is set of studying urgent problems which have immediate practical value based upon existing fundamental knowledge. And, finally, the third level is the techniques, the area of the practical introduction of scientific knowledge in the aim of designing various technical devices and improving the existing techniques. In social sciences, the technological sphere is usually termed social engineering.

The three designated levels undoubtedly should be present and function in a mature scientific discipline. It is also clear that in the absence of any of these levels, the institutionalization of the science cannot be considered complete and its effectiveness has not reached, so to speak, the threshold value. These should also be present in sociology if it is to claim the status of a normal scientific discipline.

In American sociology, for example, the problem of the differentiation of the levels of cognitive activity was recognized rather well in the 1930s, and at present there is a generally accepted division of labor between academic science, applied research and social engineering. This division of labor has a solid material-financial and organizational basis under it, although the distinction between these levels is quite fluid. V.A. Yadov has rightly pointed out that at present in the West and particularly in the United States, the applied function is prevailing and characteristic of Western sociology as a whole is a problem oriented approach [7]. At the same

time, we must not overlook the indisputable fact that the conceptual and methodological basis of applied research is comprised of the theoretical and methodological concepts of academic sociology which has put down deep roots in VUZ or, more accurately, the university milieu. The theory of social action, structural functionalism, neoevolutionism, symbolic interactionism, ethnomethodology and other concepts represent different variations of academic sociology which should provide a theoretical basis for the universal models of man's social conduct and the principles of social organization. Unfortunately, we do not have anything like this with the exception, perhaps, of the concept of the disposition regulation of conduct proposed by V.A. Yadov, although we often employ the conceptual apparatus of certain academic concepts without giving its real source. An example of this would be the role theory of personality popular in our country the bases of which were established in the 1930s by the American scholars G. Meade, R. Lipton and others.

Here it would be wise to emphasize that precisely the establishing of an authoritative academic theory in American sociology in the 1950s and which at that time was associated with the theory of social action and a structural-system methodology concluded a protracted period in the industrialization of sociology as an autonomous and independent discipline. By this time, the other "tiers" in the functioning of sociological knowledge—the applied research and social engineering—already had the experience of several decades and many organizational questions had been successfully resolved. The ASA [American Sociological Association] had been established in 1905, there were several authoritative journals, a system had been organized for training scientific personnel in the universities, there was public recognition by various social groups and so forth. However, precisely the establishing of an authoritative general sociological theory served as the most important factor in the institutionalizing of sociology in the United States.

Unfortunately, in Soviet sociology the notion of the exceptionally important role of theoretical knowledge (not to confuse this with the sociophilosophical and political "bases") still had not gained an understanding that in and of itself it can serve as a symptom of the discipline's immaturity. The widespread identification of general sociological theory with historical materialism merely confuses and impedes the process of establishing such theories. Individual attempts at forming independent sociological theories which are based upon their own conceptual apparatus and tested empirical facts and generalizations have been extremely rare in Soviet sociology. As far as I know, such work has been done only in the area of family sociology [8], but even here the theoretical research has not had a noticeable impact on the state of this branch since a large portion of the research as before has a sociostatistical, descriptive character.

For this reason, it seems to me that the disputes which have newly broken out over the subject of sociology will remain scholastic and sterile as long as a scientific, general sociological theory is not formulated or, at least, a certain generally accepted conceptual model is worked out for the sphere of social reality studied by sociology and providing a general notion of the functioning of society, its social institutions and structures.

The absence of a developed theory has as one of its negative consequences the circumstance that it is extremely difficult to distinguish sociological research *per se* from other types of social research, particularly from the socioeconomic, since up to now it has not been clear what their uniqueness is. The conclusion emerges that the term "sociology" is really a collective concept for various sociostatistical research and this research occupies a "no-man's land" between economics and psychology. The subjects of the articles published in the given journal rather clearly shows the absence of any precise standards for identifying research as "sociological." Here one can find everything: from sociophilosophical essays to an analysis of reader preferences, but here the socioeconomic problem clearly prevails.

In this instance there is a more suitable term for such research and this is "sociography" understood as a free description and literary interpretation of a certain circle of empirical facts. For many of our newspapers and journals, sociology is identified with a study of public opinion and this is not at all correct, since actually the sociological study and mass polling of different social groups have different aims and tasks determined by the posing of a certain problem, by the advancing of hypotheses and so forth. The study of public opinion is a typical indicator of applied research and in principle here one can dispense with the term "sociology," as has been done in certain Western European countries, calling such work *demoscopic* [9].

The infatuation with statistical and strictly empirical methods of social research represents an unique "professional infantilism" of Soviet sociology as the standard rooted in the minds of many sociologist researchers for sociostatistical applied research is erroneously identified with a scientific standard for sociological research generally while in reality this is only its initial level. American sociology, for example, was infected with this disease during the 1920s through the 1940s and its relapses can now be seen in the context of the strong demand for applied research. Like any disease, this "professional infantilism" is capable of obstructing progressive growth for the science for a certain period and even lead to negative results, to so-called creeping empiricism and individual awful symptoms of this can already be spotted in Soviet sociology. But it is to be hoped that its active involvement in the process of the development of world sociology and the extremely high demand of society itself for the development of an effective and influential system of sociological knowledge will serve as a serious impetus for escaping from the blind alley into which it has currently made its way.

One can only regret the fact that precisely now, during the period of the growing democratization of the nation, when the awakened social conscience of the people shows great trust in sociology, the sociologists themselves due to insufficient professionalism and the deep-rooted adherence to ideological dogma propagandize a distorted notion of their science, reducing its content and cognitive potential merely to applied functions of sociological knowledge, in focusing on carrying out the next social orders.

From the position of developing the process of the institutionalization of sociology in our nation and its present-day crisis state, one can note several ways out of the existing situation.

In the first place, the experience in the development of Western sociology shows that the socioorganizational and material basis for the successful establishment of sociology is the sphere of university and VUZ education, where the best conditions can be created for the development of fundamental research, both theoretical and applied. Analogously in our nation, the university chairs and departments of sociology should become their support base. Here it is important from the very outset to choose correctly the guidelines, aiming at the predominant development of fundamental research, for which it is essential as a first step to carry out extensive work to adapt the Western scholarly literature and then move on to assimilating the concepts of academic sociology. Whether we like it or not, without the painstaking and thoughtful work of assimilating the achievements of Western sociology, there will be no serious headway and we will never get free of our provincialism. Considering the professional unpreparedness of the VUZ milieu for assimilating and developing sociology, it would make sense to begin by setting up a chair of "sociology and social psychology," as we have a significant army of psychologists with a sociological orientation and these could make up the cadre backbone of these chairs and in addition the sociopsychological orientation could offset the infatuation with sociostatistical research.

Secondly, the task of developing fundamental research and theoretical concepts should hold a priority place in the activities of the academy scientific research centers and above all the Sociology Institute of the USSR Academy of Sciences, where up to now there has been no department for the theoretical problems of sociology. A majority of the empirical sociologists, due to the practical orientation of the research carried out by them, has not shown any interest in these questions. In their mass, the sociologists have a very hazy notion of the methodological problems involved in forming theoretical knowledge in sociology and they lack an elementary understanding of modern world sociology.

Finally, and most importantly, what is required for a radical restructuring in Soviet sociology is an overcoming of the ideological blinders and the political control of the science, developing a critical self-awareness and civil responsibility among the scientists.

Finally, it is essential to free ourselves of the stereotypic perception of sociology as a strictly applied discipline, as in this aspect it inevitably will remain a part of the administrative-bureaucratic system.

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A Sick Science in a Sick Society

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[Article by Gennadiy Aleksandrovich Nesvetaylov, candidate of technical sciences and head of the department of the history of science at the Institute of Sociology of the Belorussian Academy of Sciences. This is the first time he appears in our journal]

[Text] Is it possible to have a healthy science in a sick society? Certainly it is, if the illness is short and science is living in a germ-free ivory tower. But we have actively broken down the social partitions which separated science from society and now all their basic problems are developing in a close interaction. The process of inter-influence in a normal state has a catalytic character and is an accelerating process while in pathology it has the character of a mutual infecting which causes a paralysis of thought and deed.

An analysis of the concrete dynamics of this problem and the ways of solving it must be carried out within the context of the traditional theme for sociology "science and society." The concept "science—social institution" views scientific activity as the product of knowledge for the needs of society with a simultaneous assessment and monitoring of the knowledge's quantity and quality. Here the scientists are guided by the values and standards the aggregate of which comprises, according to R. Merton, the ethos of science [1]. The linkage of scientific activity with society underlies the value and normative structure of a science and the interests of society substantially influence the activity and relations in the science, performing a regulative function [2]. The development of science is under the powerful impact of the social values and standards prevailing in a society and these can both support as well as suppress the institutional standards of science. In this context the pathology of science as a social institution is inseparable from the pathology of society.

The converting of Soviet scholastic social science into one that is experimental and closely tied to real life unfailingly would bring up the sociology of science which should now focus its attention not on the creating of myths concerning the advantages of the social organization of Soviet society but on the real patterns in the interaction of science and society in the crisis situation and in emerging from it. Let us endeavor to show the concrete dynamics of certain aspects in the interaction of science and society drawing on the materials of Soviet science in recent decades, predominantly in the sphere of fundamental research as the most important for the reproduction of society's healthy intellectual potential.

An Unclaimed Science Ages

The crisis in Soviet science, including fundamental, is confirmed by a large number of figures and facts [3, 4]. It has been shown that the most important factor in the reduced cognitive value of the research is the aging of the subjects and the drop in the share of new areas in the total volume of fundamental research being carried out [5]. At the same time, it is scarcely valid to have a cumulative model for the deterioration of things in science, reflecting an ongoing accumulation of negative effects. In our view, the interaction of the cognitive and social structures in science is more precisely described within the context of a theory of scientific-technical and socioeconomic cycles [6]. This proves that the waves of the scientific and technical revolution [STR] spreading throughout the world provide the most global nature of changes.

In the 1950s and 1960s, regardless of the previous disasters, our nation successfully assimilated the first wave of the STR and this was insured by the accelerated investment of society's resources and the material-technical means into the basic scientific and technical areas: nuclear power, space engineering and quantum electronics. The high defense potential of these areas under the conditions of the military confrontation

ensured their priority development mode including the forming of new areas of fundamental research and the prompt employment of its results. At that time, for Soviet fundamental science there was a fortuitous coinciding in time of three factors: the start of the first wave of the STR, the state priorities of scientific and technical development, and the great resource capabilities of the extensive development stage of the national economy. Precisely the sciences linked to the defense complex and primarily physics provided society with an abundant harvest of fundamental results by the forming and accelerated elaboration of new areas of research. For example, an analysis of the number of scientific discoveries in the USSR over the last 40 years indicates that from the viewpoint of producing fundamentally new knowledge the 1950s were the most effective, when 34 percent of the entire fund of scientific discoveries was made and particularly in the 1960s with 46 percent (estimated from [7]).

But the socioeconomic potential of the first STR was virtually exhausted by the end of the 1980s. The second wave of the STR took its place on the historical scene and the take-off of this was the 1980s in the developed capitalist countries. Now the basic areas were microelectronics, informatics, biotechnology and the defense potential of these was not so clearly expressed as for the areas of the first wave of the STR. Moreover, the possibilities of extensive growth in scientific and technical potential declined sharply and this narrowed the social space for the renewal of the scientific areas. Resource limitations were not compensated for by new possibilities for the socioeconomic mechanism of science's development. Its irrelevance to practice became the most important factor in the stabilizing of the cognitive and social existing structures.

The stagnation in society gradually also penetrated into science. This was manifested, in our view, primarily by the too slow release of resources from the traditional scientific areas and their delayed transition to new questions. For example, an analysis of the number of scientific works which receive the USSR state prize in the scientific area shows that the average duration of the awarded research cycle in 1967-1970 was 8.7 years, in 1971-1975, it was 9.8 years, in 1976-1980, it was 13.2 years, in 1981-1985, 15.8 years and in 1986-1988, 18.5 years.¹ In other words, a majority of the scientific areas designated with prizes had commenced in the 1960s.

The elaboration of predominantly the traditional scientific areas was a prerequisite for a drop in the return on fundamental research. Out of the total number of scientific discoveries of the USSR, only 18 percent related to the 1970s and around 2 percent to the 1980s. One is struck by the long time lag between the date of discovery and the date of its official recognition. As a whole for the registered discoveries for requests submitted no later than 1960, this was 6.4 years, in 1961-1965, it was 6 years, in 1966-1970, 8 years, in 1971-1975, 9.1 years, in 1976-1980, 11.4 years and in 1981-1988, 15.5 years.

This shows that recently we have recognized achievements produced predominantly in the 1960s.

These and other data (see, for example, [6]) indicate that in our nation the period of stagnation for the second wave of the STR, as strange as this might seem at first glance, was a significantly stronger impediment than the Stalinist repressions and the wartime destruction for the first wave of the STR. As a result, the epicenter of the second STR was the United States, Japan and Western Europe, while we are still persuading one another that without biotechnology we would die, without dependable microelectronics we would come to a halt and without informatics we would drop out of the world community. The fact that in public opinion the feeling of the quantitative lag has been replaced by a feeling of qualitative distance from the industrially developed states is to be explained precisely by the fact that they are on the take-off of a new wave of the STR while our nation is still living in the decline of the first STR. We can argue for a long time over what socialism we want to build or rebuild, but even now it is clear that this is a society which will live in the second STR. For this reason, we cannot carry out the perestroika processes in isolation from the patterns of cyclical scientific-technical development as these dictate their demands of the pace of modernization and the increased importance of updating scientific potential.

Science in the Palm of the State

The role of the state in the renewal of scientific potential depends substantially upon in what stage of their formation and development are the major scientific and technical areas or the aggregate of technologically related production (technological structures) [8]. In the phase of their development the leading principal in management should not be the department or individual enterprise but rather the state. The task of state management is above all financial, material-technical and information support for the science as the basis of society's intellectual potential, fundamental research as a source of fundamentally new knowledge and technical solutions, expert evaluation and choice of the best strategic variations of scientific and technical decisions and prompt modernization of the educational system. In the following phases of the life cycle of the technological structures, the role of the state in managing scientific and technical progress naturally declines with a growing role for the socioeconomic mechanism of self-organization and commodity-monetary relations. Precisely these mechanisms should have played the main role in the development of the technological structures of our society in the decline of the first wave of the STR. Unfortunately, the delay in changing over to a market economy has become one of the main reasons for the inhibiting of scientific and technical progress.

At present, in planning a mass changeover in the scientific and technical sphere to the areas of the second wave of the STR, we must not go to the other extreme and allow this vitally important process to be completely

taken over by market relations. Precisely in the first phases of the new areas it is essential to maintain a leading role for the state, but not as a citadel of bureaucratic structures but rather as a civilized management principal which on a planned basis ensures the most favored conditions for new scientific and technical areas within the context of the market economy.

A most important prerequisite for the success of this restructuring will be the attitude of society toward scientific potential as a strategic resource and as a basis of society's intellectual potential. The socioeconomic progress of a large state is possible only on the basis of employing predominantly domestic fundamental scientific potential. The attempt to transfer the payment for the research function to the shoulders of other countries can lead not to a savings but to self-strangulation and to the loss of a historical prospect for the development of our nation as an industrially developed one.

The process of the accumulation of knowledge is based on economic accumulation and is subordinate to its laws [9]. Out of the total holding of accumulation obtained from surplus product, funds are assigned for the development of science and these as a result of scientific labor are turned into a sum of new knowledge. For this reason the basic characteristics of scientific potential depend upon the dynamics of the socioeconomic indicators and primarily upon national income. For example, the 1960s were characterized by high average annual increase rates in the produced national income (7.8 percent in 1966-1970), expenditures on science from the state budget and other sources (11.2 percent), the number of scientific workers (6.9 percent) and the annual average number of employees in science and scientific services (4.6 percent) [10]. New scientific institutions sprung up like mushrooms and in public opinion the career of a scientist was seen as the most dynamic and attractive.

But, unfortunately, the state did not establish an economic mechanism which would encourage scientific and technical progress. The scientific harvest was reaped predominantly by the sectors not directly working for man (defense, space). In a predominant majority of the peaceful sectors of the national economy, an extensive type of development flourished without the regular use of scientific results which would have ensured economic possibilities for a further rise in expenditures on science from increased efficiency of social production. Naturally in the 1970s, a slowdown began in the development of resources for science. The increase in the number of scientific and scientific-pedagogical workers had to be virtually halted (an annual average growth of 0.7 percent in 1986-1988), while the number employed in science and scientific services even had to decline. The maintaining at this time of a high growth rate for expenditures on science (9.8 percent) was not an indicator of the real development of resources for science due to the disruption of the monetary system.

The postwar experience in the development of scientific potential in the USSR has shown, in our view, that the

high road to state support for science is not a simple increase in expenditures for this but rather the establishing of a socioeconomic mechanism which constantly shapes the demand of public production for scientific and technical products and the reciprocal supply of new ideas from science. Only having overcome this bottleneck in the innovation cycle will the state be able to give up the residual principle in the financing of science and establish normal conditions for expanded reproduction of new knowledge. Here state encouragement for scientific and technical progress should create an innovative climate in society [11]. The possible socioeconomic forms of state support for science are very diverse. In addition to direct financing, these consist in the development of higher education, the carrying out of a tax, amortization and credit-monetary policy, the introduction of antimonopoly legislation, the development of a state system of scientific and technical information, standards and quality as well as the carrying out of patent and licensing policy.

An important form of state encouragement of science, particularly fundamental, is a policy of priorities in the development of the areas of knowledge. In economics and sociology it has long been shown that a new quality is primarily a new structure. In the given instance the shifts in the sectorial structure of the scientific potential must be considered as among the pending restructurings of it. The once set system of state priorities in developing the areas of knowledge (primarily space and nuclear physics and for biology and psychology with what was left) over the postwar decades has led to structural warpings of personnel potential and to its excessive "technization" with an insufficient share for the sciences dealing with living matter. In the recent history of Soviet science this trend was established under the conditions of the arms race and in the wave of space successes in 1957-1961. At that time, science with a comparatively small number of scientists (354,000 persons in 1960) earned such great authority in society that later it attracted hundreds of thousands of new workers into science. Thus, during the 5 years which directed followed the flight of Yu.A. Gagarin, the number of scientific personnel in the nation increased by 310,000 persons. Particularly benefiting here were the "celebrants" of the space age—the technical and physicomathematical sciences—the share of which in the total increase in the number of scientific workers was 54 percent and 11 percent, respectively [12]. At the same time, the most important sectors of the natural sciences—chemical and biological—at that time had just 2.4 and 3.9 percent, respectively, of the total increase in the number of Soviet scientists.

Such a ratio underlay the planning "from the distinct" for a long time. Throughout the world a second STR got underway with the leader of the natural sciences being physicochemical biology while our priority of iron over living matter continued in effect. The thesis that the rapid growth of resources should be replaced by its qualitative improvement was to touch the technical

sciences last. Upon emerging from the years of stagnation in 1981-1985, the technical sciences comprised 61.9 percent of the total increase in the number of the nation's technical personnel and the fate of the biological sciences as before did not go much beyond 3 percent. And now the chief distinction in the scientific potentials of the USSR and the industrially developed nations, in our view, should be sought not in volume indicators but rather structural ones. Thus, the sciences concerned with living matter employ 50 percent of the personnel in the academic sector in the United States and only 34 percent in the USSR, including 22 percent and 9 percent, respectively, in the biological sciences [13]. The number of persons holding academic degrees and employed in biology for all the sectors of science in the USSR is 40 percent less than in the United States.

The substantial lag in the potential of the sciences dealing with living matter in the USSR behind the Western nations inevitably will impede a reorienting of the economy to the needs of man, to solving the most important problems in protecting the environment, public health, biotechnology as well as raising the productivity of agriculture. It is obvious that over the long run, major changes will be required in the sectorial structure of the scientific potential primarily in favor of the sciences dealing with living matter. Such major changes in the structural characteristics can be achieved, as world experience indicates, primarily by support from the state budget and by involvement of the state in the centralized planning of a new structural policy in the sphere of scientific and technical progress.

The Man of Science: An Inferiority Complex

The extended disinterest of social practice in the broad application of scientific results had a negative impact upon strengthening the links between science and society and horizontal ties of the "producer-consumer" type. Instead of these, the administrative-command system organized vertical relations of the subordination type between science and the state. The mediated assessment natural for science through the consumption of the new knowledge gained by it was replaced by a direct assessment through obedience. This disrupted the personality of the scientific worker, creating from him a conformist devoid of initiative and his own opinion and who weakened the protective responses of science, having created a syndrome of acquired immune deficiency, vis-a-vis the outside administrative effect. Through such a personality of the scientist during the years of stagnation science was infected with all the illnesses of society: bureaucratization, a reduced incentive for labor, a drop in the social prestige of creative activity, bribery and theft, the forming of cliques, servility and so forth. And when the shortcomings in economic development assumed a crisis nature, this was fully felt by the scientific personnel.

As in the other social spheres, in science the situation was also exacerbated by the problem of the deficit which, however, in relation to the personnel in the fundamental

sciences, has its specific features as the number of talented persons in society fit for successfully carrying out fundamental research is significantly more limited than the number of specialists prepared under the plan for the sphere of material production. The main resource limitation on the development of academic science has been not the amount of financing for the scientific research but rather the number of persons with a specialized higher education capable of and desiring to work in the sphere of fundamental research. In practice this consideration has not always been realized everywhere, particularly in the extensive stage in the development of the Soviet economy. At that time the forced increase in the number of personnel in academic science was not supported by the more rapid development of the entire educational system and by the targeted training of specialists in whom the knowledge, professional skills and motivational sphere would satisfy the tasks of fundamental research. The disrupting of the balance between supply and demand in this sphere led to a situation where the social mechanism for the recruitment of personnel which had come into being historically in terms of the specific nature of scientific creativity and which would operate effectively only under the conditions of a surplus of those who were desirous and capable was gradually replaced by a conventional mechanism for the recruitment of personnel and this proceeded from the staffing and financial capabilities of the institution and not from the creative capabilities of the individual.

The unnaturally high growth rate for the scientific sphere forced a search for additional reserves of scientific personnel. For example, the academic institutions accepted specialists from production, basically engineers. The deficit in university graduates was also made up by engineer specialties. As a result, coming into the sphere of fundamental research were persons with a basic education oriented not at studying phenomena, but rather creating designs and production methods and this contributed later to the excessive "applications focus" in academic science. The lag in the educational sphere behind the needs of science also forced the hiring of graduates from the evening and correspondence departments of the VUZes where the quality of specialist training was lower than at the daytime departments. One other additional source of personnel was the accelerated feminization of Soviet science (the annual average increase rate in the number of female scientific workers in 1961-1965 was 14.7 percent in comparison with 12.7 percent for men).

By the end of the 1970s, the decline in the prestige of creative labor in the sphere of fundamental research had led to a situation where the compulsory allocating of young specialists in academic science had become the rule. A concrete sociological study conducted by us specially has shown, among the graduates from the physics faculty at the BGU [Belorussian State University] imeni V.I. Lenin in 1978 and 1979, the most popular was allocation to enterprises (almost 2 persons per vacancy) and then to the VUZ (1.6), while those

desiring to be assigned to scientific research institutes was fewer than the number of open positions (0.85). One-third (in 1979, 25 percent) of the graduates assigned to the scientific research institutes did not wish to be engaged in scientific work. The grade average in the records of the graduates was: 4.47 among those assigned by the BGU and only 4.16 to the institutions of the Belorussian Academy of Sciences.

Thus, within the bowels of the extensive development of academic science, problems arose of a personnel deadwood and these problems later contributed to the strengthening mechanism of inhibition. For example, the deadwood portion of our personnel potential possesses low vocational mobility while high mobility is characteristic, as a rule, of creative specialists who are viable and believe in their own forces. As a result at present, personnel turnover has eliminated from academic science the most promising and skilled portion of the personnel, particularly among the youth. Thus, at the Belorussian Academy of Sciences in 1988, for every 100 dismissed scientific workers there were 38 candidates of sciences and 5 doctor of sciences, while among those hired there were, respectively, only 18 and 3 persons (for more detail see [14]).

The domestic "brain drain" has recently been supplemented by an external drain in the form of the departure of scientists overseas for permanent or temporary employment. The scale of this process is hard to assess now but it is obvious that the most creatively gifted researchers have already received or will receive invitations.² Their immediate involvement in the world scientific process is basically a positive phenomenon as is confirmed by the experience of many countries. All the same, science is international as a system of knowledge but as a source of intellectual potential and as an object of capital investment, it is profoundly national, being an inseparable part of a modern society. For this reason, international scientific collaboration can include the departure of scientists for extended work but should not come down to just this. In our opinion, the problem of the "brain drain" from the scientific viewpoint requires a comprehensive investigation of all its aspects, including scientific, social, economic and psychological. From the practical viewpoint, our state must, in following the UNESCO recommendations on the status of scientific workers, assist in seeing to it that the scientific workers "find encouraging incentives to work for the good of their country and return to it in the event that they endeavor to obtain a portion of their education, training or experience overseas" [15].

Incentives here can be divided into material and moral and the ratio between them depends essentially upon the

degree of the creative saturation of labor. Material incentives for the renewal of academic science can be realized, in our view, primarily through creating its general material prestige in comparison with the other sectors of the national economy which employ simpler labor. The long-term conditions for attracting and retaining creatively thinking young people in the sphere of fundamental research can scarcely be based on any particular bonus system. More effective is the outstripping of science relative to the other sectors of the national economy in terms of the average monthly wage.

Unfortunately, the actual trend has been directly the opposite. In 1965, the average monthly monetary wage in the sector "science and scientific services" was 125 percent of the analogous indicator for the entire USSR national economy, while in 1985, this ratio declined to 106 percent; at the same time, for example, in the United States, the average earnings of scientific workers outstripped the national average by 1.7-1.8-fold [16]. The job groups such a junior science associates and temporary researchers were in a particularly disastrous position. What sort of competition in being admitted to graduate studies or to employment in a scientific organization could there be if, for example, in the 1980s, one of the leaders with international recognition, the Physics Institute of the Belorussian Academy of Sciences, paid for the labor of junior science associates at the following scale: 140 rubles a month with under 2 years experience; a salary of 150 rubles for those who had passed the candidate minimum for the general subjects and had published two or three scientific works; a salary of 160 rubles for the defense of a dissertation in the coming year and the co-worker participating in economic contracts. If a completed dissertation is submitted to the Academic Council, then this very labor intensive result receives an additional...5 rubles. For such junior science associates it has long been clear that academic science in our nation is considered in the second category sectors.

The wage reform carried out in 1986 in the scientific organizations did not cause any noticeable changes in these trends and this is also characteristic for the individual Union republics (Table 1). After the converting of the enterprises to cost accounting in 1988, the scientific institutions, for example, of the Belorussian Academy of Sciences were only 101 percent of the wage level in the republic economy. The conversion of academic science to the new conditions of financing and management has created prerequisites for rectifying the existing situation (a rise for this indicator up to 108 percent in 1989). However, the basic opportunities for increasing the income of scientists as before are closely linked to applied types of work and this creates a major threat to the cognitive goals of fundamental research.

Table 1: Ratio of Average Monthly Wages of Manual and White Collar Personnel in Science and as a Whole for Belorussian Economy (Republic Economy = 100%)*

Economic Sector	1980	1985	1986	1987	1988	1989
Science and scientific services	107	105	104	104	110	127
Including:						
Scientific research institutions of Belorussian Academy of Sciences, %	111	105	103	106	101	108

* Calculated from data in [17] and the Presidium of the Belorussian Academy of Sciences

The problem of wages in fundamental science can become even more acute after the conversion to a market economy, when there is a sharp disruption in the ratio of science and production-economic activities not only in terms of material incentives but also moral ones. Up to the present, regardless of the material difficulties, science has continued to provide society with new results, ensuring its tomorrow. This has happened due to the enthusiasm of those creative individuals for whom our land has always been famous. For such persons the lag of science behind other national economic sectors in terms of average wage levels is at least partially compensated for by its obvious advantages in the creative content of the labor and by the opportunities for realizing the intellectual potential of the individual. But during the years of stagnation, there has been a sharp increase in the bureaucratic regimentation of research work and the alienating of the worker from the means of scientific production and its end results. The creative charge of scientific labor has declined more rapidly than wages have risen.

The disassembly of the administrative system and the democratization of economic life will lead, it is our hope, in the near future to a situation where here space is provided for professional initiative and entrepreneurship. The permanently determined course of events will gradually give way to a diversity, unexpectedness and to the risk of a market economy. Business will also become creativity but significantly better paid. Under these conditions personnel policy should consider the dialectics of the interaction of the particularly institutional and general social standards in the process of scientific activity (according to R. Merton, the ambivalence of the scientist). This problem is manifested in the process of the shaping of the scientist's personality under the impact of a normative value system initially of society and later of science [2]. While for an extended time spiritual values were not given priority in society, it is no surprise that in converting to commodity-monetary relations the social goals of primary enrichment can be stronger than the research motivation for many young persons. In competition with business for the most capable portion of the younger generation, fundamental science will win out only in making maximum use of the merit of creative freedom as a self-sufficient incentive. This will be aided by the destruction of the bureaucratic

regulation of research work, by joining the world scientific community, by returning to the scientific worker the feeling of being the master of intellectual property and by returning the legitimate rights to the people who are the carriers of the social role of anticonformist.

The socioeconomic mechanism of personnel policy in academic science undoubtedly should also include rigid elements to free it of the noncreative portion of persons engaged as scientific workers. Competition, temporary contracts, flexibility in organizational structures, priority of a scientific problem over scientific organization, scientific principledness of the scientists with a reciprocal assessment of the work and, most importantly, an innovative climate in society—all of this should help to find the required balance for the social protection of a scientific person against administrative arbitrariness and economic poverty with the social protection of academic science itself against a surplus of deadwood personnel.

Provincialism in Science

The crisis phenomena in the development of fundamental science are exacerbated by the archaic and completely unjustified system of splitting the academic institutions into two categories in terms of the wages of the scientific workers. In recent years this problem has virtually not involved the USSR Academy of Sciences as among its institutes only 3 percent was in the second category, while among the institutions of the republic academies, the figure was 47 percent. Such differentiation plays the role of one of the levers of a socioeconomic mechanism which reinforces the presence in the structure of scientific potential of two different-quality parts, the capital and the peripheral, and contributes to the development of provincialism in fundamental science. In the general instance provincialism as a lag behind the advanced front of world science is not a geographic concept but rather one of level and the overall level of scientific potential is determined by the lower level of any of its components. It is possible to work in a capital but lose contact with world science due to the hopelessly backward resource support.

The provincialism of modern science to a decisive degree has been caused by the low level of material and technical support for the research. Numerous examples from the history of modern science persuasively show

that a majority of the fundamental results has been achieved due to new instruments and to methods of observation and processing their results. The determining influence of social production on the development of science is now manifested not only through the forming of a demand for its results, as has been pointed out even by the founders of Marxism, but also through the material and technical support for research activities. The equipment from the productive forces remains a general social factor in the formation and development of new scientific areas while research equipment is becoming an internal scientific factor in the formation of these scientific areas [18]. For this reason, the sociology of science should, in our view, view as the principal of scientific activity not merely the scientist nor the scientific collective, but rather the equipped scientist or the equipped collective or researchers.

It is possible to analyze the problem of material and technical support for science following the customary scheme of "successes have been achieved however there are substantial shortcomings." But if we call things by their real names, then the situation must be judged critical. The equipping of Soviet researchers with instruments in cost terms is 4-or 5-fold lower than in the United States [19]. If we consider the obsolescence of the equipment and the price factor, then it turns out that a USSR scientific worker is scores of times more poorly equipped than is a Western scientist. For many types of instruments we are two or three generations behind. In world science it is now a standard procedure to order equipment by telephone, but in our country many laboratories lack not only modern equipment but also a telephone. Throughout the world, computer networks link scientists together but in our nation they are separated both by the absence of the networks as well as by the system of administrative prohibitions. The organizing committees of international scientific conferences already accept papers recorded on diskettes while in our country as before typewriters are in short supply. We simply do not have an industry for scientific chemical agents and this has paralyzed the efforts to develop many modern areas of chemistry and the sciences concerned with living matter.

A scientific man in the 1990s who is armed with instruments and equipment of the 1970s can scarcely prepare for scientific and technical breakthroughs in the 21st Century. Vanguard production technology first requires vanguard research technology. Without modern instruments, computers, chemical agents and compounds the collectives from the viewpoint of the return of fundamental research are turned into "black holes" which do not emit the light of knowledge but rather draw in significant amounts of financing for supporting the existence of scientific organizations. The chronic technical backwardness gradually reduces the overall skill level of the scientific personnel, it warps the motivational sphere, it creates a psychology of inferiority and forms marginal layers of the scientific community regardless of where the research collectives are located, that is, at the center or on the periphery.

While noting the general nature of the problem of provincialism for our science, at the same time it must be emphasized that the strategic errors of locating scientific potential, the departmental approach and monopoly in science have made provincialism a concept that is primarily geographic. It has become the reverse side of the overcentralization in the management of scientific life within the administrative-command system. For example, Moscow has only 6 percent of the candidates of science working in the country, however here around 57 percent of the titles of scientific journals in the USSR is published and 82 percent of the journals of the USSR Academy of Sciences.³ Such a concentration of publishing resources leads to the monopolizing of entire scientific areas and creates unequal opportunities for access to the channels of written communications for the scientists of the capital and peripheral scientific centers. After this, it is no surprise that in the list of scientific works put out by many provincial academic institutions up to 60 percent of the publications is comprised of the abstracts of papers some two or three pages long and these are more a source of alerting information than they are of new knowledge.

The system for certifying scientific personnel in our nation is also characterized by superfluous centralization. Under the flag of fighting for a rise in the level and a uniformity of demands on dissertations, there has been not only the bureaucratizing of certification work in the nation but also its excessive territorial concentration in the capital. For example, over the period of 1980-1989, 47 percent of the doctoral dissertations prepared in the nation were submitted for defense to the specialized councils of Moscow, although only 16 percent of the total number of USSR doctors of sciences works here.⁴ In turn, the overconcentration of certification activities creates objective conditions for the monopolizing of scientific views and an administrative struggle among scientific schools. At the same time, individual republic academies take little part in certifying the scientific personnel with higher qualifications. It is no surprise that the scientific community favors a restructuring of the entire system of scientific management. It is also essential to revise the territorial structure of the specialized councils in order to reduce the monopoly role of the center and increase the actual involvement of the Union republics in the certifying of high-qualification scientific personnel.

The most important prerequisites for a successful combating of provincialism in Soviet science are its involvement in the world scientific community and democratization of all social life in the country as well as greater political, economic and cultural independence for the Union republics and autonomous formations (without developing, however, into autarky which is lethal for the development of fundamental research). Absolutely imperative are sufficient resource support without distinction between center and periphery as well as a cardinal rise in the professional and cultural level of the entire educational system. Clearly in the overall concept

for the managing of scientific and technical progress in the USSR, the block of regional development problems for scientific potential should hold significantly greater space than at present. From the scientific and socioeconomic viewpoints, it is essential to establish the further fate of the provincial scientific centers. Particular attention must be paid to the fate of the peripheral institutions in converting to market relations so that they do not become the grounds for displacing fundamental research on the scale of the entire Union republics.

Science in the Marketplace

In assessing the situation around Soviet science as a whole, it must be recognized that its main ailment is a shunning by practice and the path for a cure lies in involvement in intensive social production. The creation of a socioeconomic mechanism for the susceptibility of production to scientific and technical progress is, as is known, one of the most important tasks in converting the nation to a market economy. It is expected that the innovative nature of social production will regularly reproduce the demand for fundamentally new technology. This, in turn, will restore the natural social function of fundamental science as a source of new ideas and not as an attribute of the administrative system. The indirect assessment of scientists through the consumption of knowledge obtained by them and not through obedience will create the social conditions for the restoration of the work ethic and the culture of scientific labor as the basis for future achievements in fundamental research.

At the same time, it is apparent that during the transitional period serious difficulties confront Soviet science. The harmonizing of relations between science and production will be particularly difficult under the conditions of the shortage of a broad range of types of products and services and when in the forefront is the task of satisfying the demand for a simple rise in their quantity and not higher quality. Why develop new medicines if the drug-store does not even have the old familiar ones? A commodity in short supply does not have any socioeconomic incentives for improvement as there is a demand for it even without better quality. In other words, the hormone of economic interest in the veins of scientific and technical progress is killed by the deficit virus. The situation is exacerbated by the virtual bottomlessness of the domestic market as this paralyzes a most important element in the economic levers for accelerating scientific and technical progress, that is, competition among the producers for a consumer.

Clearly, these problems can be solved only by greater efforts on the part of all society and after a protracted interval of time during which the state will have to protect fundamental science against the forces of the forming market relations. It is essential to avoid the extremes related to a romanticizing of market relations and the possibility of commercializing fundamental research. The crisis in the nation objectively dictates a priority for tactical goals over strategic ones. This has

already led, for example, to a reduction in the volume of production capital investments and this, to put it mildly, does not help to broaden the scale of employing fundamentally new equipment. On the other hand, as in the era of stagnation, again there is popularity, particularly in resolving regional problems, for a social demand on academic science in the form of an ambulance which upon the first call rushes to the plant entrance or to the driveway of the soviet. For the help of academic science there must be a balance between strategic and tactical priorities and during the transitional period this can be provided only with a leading role for the state in planning major structural shifts along the chain "science—technology—economy—society."

In somewhat oversimplifying the issue, let us say that state support for fundamental research can provide three variations for its development: expansion, preservation or curtailment. Optimism combined with realism makes it possible to assume that in the transitional period the first and last are the most unrealistic of the listed approaches to development. Consequently, it is essential to focus all attention on state support for the strategy of maintaining fundamental science, meaning by this not the preserving of the existing social structures but rather the maintaining of its natural role in society. The scientific workers should defend before public opinion the specific features of academic science which is responsible on a nationwide scale for an ascent to the second wave of the STR as well as the renewal of society's intellectual potential by carrying out fundamental research and preparing highly skilled scientific personnel. Science, as a factor in the rational self-regulation of social processes, will recuperate along with society, particularly if the state will generously warm it with the heat of its palm.

Footnotes

1. Calculated from the texts of the decrees of the CPSU Central Committee and the USSR Council of Ministers published in the press on awarding State Prizes in the area of science and technology.

2. According to estimates, in mid-1990, the USSR had around 250,000 scientists and specialists who had signed labor contracts with foreign firms and organizations. LENINGRADSKAYA PRAVDA, 17 June 1990.

3. Estimated from the catalog of Soyuzpechat [Main Administration for the Distribution of Publications] for 1988.

4. Estimated from the announcements of the defense of doctoral dissertations as published in the *BYULLETEN VYSSHEY ATTESTATSIONNOY KOMISSII PRI SOVETE MINISTROV SSSR* [Bulletin of the Higher Certification Commission Under the USSR Council of Ministers] for the appropriate years.

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Perestroika and Moral Values

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[Text] The acceleration of perestroika poses the following dilemma: in order to live better we must work better, but in order to work better we must live better.... At present, a person can no longer link his well-being merely to the remote future particularly as his present is in no way satisfying; the conditions under which a man lives and works, the system of incentives, the methods of realizing the principal of social justice do not contribute to the encouraging of labor. The social expectations and claims of people have become more specific.

The process of perestroika is a dialectical process. It touches on the deepest strata in the life and conscience of people but develops unevenly, for social conscience clearly has outstripped social existence (on the level of the understanding and acceptance of social and moral ideals). The latter has fallen behind in exacerbating the gap which has existed since the period of stagnation between word and deed, as ideals become more attractive, alive and "informally" incorporated in the structure of value orientations of the individual while social

reality deteriorates in terms of many indicators: inflation, the deficit, strikes and interethnic conflicts, increased crime, as well as centrifugal feelings in a number of the Union republics. This is why perestroika as both a social and individual awareness is impossible "in and of itself," outside an organic unity with activity and with the transformation of the entire aggregate of social relations (this would be "enlightenment"). Excessive "pressure on conscience," particularly by strictly administrative and ideological methods can produce little that is positive and, on the contrary, rather leads to a result with a "minus sign" or the rejection of those values which are being implanted, to growing skepticism, to inner conflict and nihilism. At the same time, in possessing relative independence of social existence, when given an active principle, awareness should be reinforced in the given quality. Without this there is no revolution, there are no substantial shifts and transformations in the economy, in the social sphere and in the entire system of human relationships.

In our view, with the deepening of perestroika, primarily there is the acute problem of reassessing values, chiefly moral ones, and which to one degree or another have accumulated political, legal, aesthetic, atheistic, religious or other views. Certainly morality does not have its localized sphere of social relations with its own institutions but rather it "permeates" all social relations and forms of conscience, comprising the nucleus of spiritual values.

All social practice is concentrated in a transformed manner in values and moral standards; morality responds very flexibly to its changes and focus. At the same time, precisely morality serves as one of the strongest regulators of social action, since in contrast, for example, to politics and law, it governs the conduct of people not indirectly but directly and in all spheres without exception. For this reason, morality operates as a practical force capable of substantially influencing a person's deeds. To our profound regret, social sciences have not been able to keep up with the development of social practice and for this reason have not yet proposed any concepts for reassessing moral values in relation to perestroika.

At present, one can observe a motley picture of moral notions and trends in their development. The process of moral renewal which is occurring in an atmosphere of the democratization of society must be investigated. But if one begins regulating this "in detail," in fearing even the slightest deviations "to the right" or "to the left," then one can only further lose the trust of the masses. It is quite natural in our current reality that the soul of the people is searching hungrily for real ways of purification and is endeavoring to get free of the unnecessary, the dogmatic, the obtuse which impedes perestroika. At times, this search leads to extremes in views. At present, when a great deal is subjected to skepticism and revision, everything should obtain its new assessment in a natural manner (and not by an introduction), it should become part of the people and gain broad support in the nation.

For a reassessment of moral values, the essential feature is not to impose ideological discipline but rather compare different positions. Sociomoral experience which came from the times of stagnation and was "disgraced" by perestroika to a large degree was full of such phenomena as nihilism, excessive pragmatism, the here-and-now of the philistine, on the one hand, and a loyalty to the principles of "at any price," on the other. Either of these is a serious departure from a realistic approach to resolving social problems as the former was caused by the individual's loss of social interests and the latter is oriented at ideals warped by the age of Stalinism and stagnation. True sociomoral values must be restored considering the concrete historical social practices. Economic changes, democratization and the legal reform are aimed at putting an end to alienation from property and from power and from one's own social group. These component parts of sociopractical reality should largely establish the structural components of an integrated personality and its moral reliability. Such in a general form is the posing of a question which is of fundamentally important significance.

Cost accounting, self-financing and covering of costs, self-management, socialist pluralism and legal guarantees for the activities of society are aimed at establishing objective conditions for the moral sovereignty and integrity of a person providing for his moral strength, creative initiative and responsibility in carrying out social tasks. Advancement precisely along this path makes it possible to understand the essence of the new morality which meets the demands of the age, as well as assimilate those economic, political and social levers by which the awakening moral values are shaped and determine the prospects for their development.

On what principles has the moral awareness of the Soviet man been shaped? In the famous speech at the Third Komsomol Congress "Tasks of the Youth Leagues," V.I. Lenin said "morality is what serves to destroy the old exploiting society and unite all the workers around the proletariat creating a new society of communists.... Communist morality is what serves this struggle." And further: "The class struggle is continuing and our task is to subordinate all interests to this struggle. And we are subordinating our communist morality to this task" [1, p 311]. Is this not utilitarianism or the idea of subordinating any means to the goal and a call to employ these means? Is this not the complete dissolution of morality in politics? Let us turn to another work by Lenin. "Does not," we read, "the judgment of whether I am acting for the good or for the bad in purchasing a weapon from a robber upon the goal and purpose of this weapon? Upon its use in a dishonest and base war or in a just and honest one?..." [2, p 364]. In the given instance, politics (the political aim) dominates over morality, however morality holds an independent, albeit subordinate position. The dialectics are such that the goal determines the means. Let us compare, as in Machiavelli the goal justifies the means. Here the role of morality has now been reduced to zero, since any means are considered good for achieving important political goals.

F.M. Dostoyevskiy also had a perfectly clear understanding of the relationship between the goal and the means. In his mind, a noble goal should be achieved by strictly moral means. Even the higher harmony of the Universe, he felt, was not worth the tears of even one tortured child [3, p 222-223]. L.M. Tolstoy shared a kindred position and he preached a philosophy of the nonresistance of evil by violence. Their abstract humanism, a humanism of the highest order but still abstract, was unviable and subsequently was reduced to moral seclusion. Here politics, in essence, is completely rejected in giving way to morality.

In any activity it is important to isolate the moral motive *per se* and see the role which it plays in directing and determining deeds. Here one of the extremes is the "moralizing" approach, that is, an observance of morality divorced from real life for the sake of morality itself. Seemingly, everything is fine as the main thing is to consistently carry out moral principles. But in reality things are much more complicated. In practice, morality does not always coincide (it would be more accurate to say that it never coincides) with moral principles taken in a pure form. Moral choice runs not along the simple scheme of "good or evil," but presupposes a consideration of many specific circumstances for each situation. A striving for results at any price is immoral. However, is it moral to have an "unassailable" position which does not lead to any practical action because the means on the moral level seem not completely "ideal"? No, this is immoral. No matter how highly moral the principles may be, in and of themselves they are worth nothing.

A person who does not act in practice cannot be considered moral no matter whatever "fine feelings" are in his soul. It is precisely for this reason that the independence of moral choice and responsibility for committed deeds are so important. Otherwise, democratization, self-management and perestroika are impossible. In order to correctly assess a deed, it is essential to take into account the moral value and the motive as well as the result, having established their actual relationship. Politics is an instrument embodying the moral values of society in life. Politics and morality, consequently, are closely interrelated through the formula "the goal determines the means." But the formula itself greatly requires clarification and concretization. For example, has our moral conscience completely understood the execution of the imperial family in Ekaterinburg soon after the revolution? Or this should be brought before the court of history, as it is a question of executing not only adults but also juveniles! A great deal has been written about the crimes of Stalinism. One has merely to recall that criminal responsibility in its harshest forms up to the death penalty (particularly for "political crimes") was extended to children starting from the age of 12.

Currently, the public is raising the question of were not the forced confiscations widespread in 1905-1907 of weapons, ammunition, money and other means for the needs of the revolution amoral as well as the annihilation of certain chiefs of the police service and government

spies in revolutionary organizations? To put it simply, does this not mean that it is possible to recognize as admissible the use of criminal methods in politics? Such methods, in the opinion of V.I. Lenin are inevitable and the very arguments over moral and amoral means in politics during the period of a revolution are "opportunistic." At the Fourth Congress of the RSDRP [Russian Social Democratic Workers Party] (1906) the Mensheviks and a portion of the Bolsheviks were against these methods and the proposal of the Leninist faction for their use did not pass. At the Fifth RSDRP Congress (1907), the dispute broke out again about the "moral philosophy" of the revolution. A majority voted for the Menshevik resolution on banning expropriations and breaking up all the special combat militias. Lenin and the Bolshevik group voted against this. Expropriations were not completely stopped [4]. A complete assessment of these facts has still not been given by our society. The problem in essence comes down to defining the limits between the admissible and the inadmissible in a formula of "the goal determines the means," between politics and morality in order to prevent the penetration of utilitarian, inhumane methods into political practice.

A utilitarian approach led to a situation where in the second half of the 1920s, morality was "ideologized" and completely reduced to politics. As a result, the voice of conscience grew weaker and gradually fell silent. It was felt that moral standards had no place in relation to the dispossessed, the repressed and criminal elements; moral relations of friendship, personal sympathy, parental and filial love and affection were declared to be devoid of independent moral value, in being totally subordinate to the interests of party and state policy.

Morality was interpreted as a tool of the bourgeoisie used for the spiritual enslavement of the masses and was identified with social standards and values alienated from the individual. Ultimately this developed into so-called "ethical negativism" and the politization of the entire social organism. Literally all spheres of life were subjected to state and social regulation and control. For example, in summing up the results of an inspection of the work done by one of the factory cells of the League youth, KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA in 1928 wrote: "By ten to a room in the dormitories and by workers in housing associations public control should be carried out over personal life" [5, p 15].

A warped political awareness and the will and energy of the masses fed by this were then employed as a fertile ground for justifying and instigating passions directed against the "enemies of the people" and for the mass unjustified repressions organized by Stalin and his henchmen. Incidentally, the echoes of those times in one form or another still reach our times. Thus, even now there is an article on criminal punishment for close relatives for sheltering from justice persons who have committed a crime. There is nothing like this in the criminal codes of other countries for so inhumane and unnatural is the character of the given legal standard!

Society is confronted with the task of purging morality of excessive politization and elaborating a moral culture based on real social relations. As a result, politics itself will be enriched.

The defining of the measure in its philosophical-sociological understanding—this is what is particularly important in the first stage of a scientific solution to this problem. Here there must be a detailed review and analysis of not only the post-October period, as is now being done, but also the entire history of the Russian state, an investigation of its "particular" path, traditions, the dialectics of the interaction of the state and civilian institutions of society and the specific features of social conscience and self-conscience. It can be assumed that all of this would tell positively both on social practice and on the forms of its reflection in the structures of morality. Philosophy, culture and morality cannot be rigidly normed systems; here a very important role is played by the value aspect and the struggle of opposites (alternatives) as a source of the spontaneous movement and development of these systems.

A very interesting notion is developed in this context by Prof M.P. Kapustin. The scholar feels that culture, like the brain, has its own "functional asymmetry" which corresponds to the universal principle of the complementary "and namely: the material is complementary to the ideal...thinking to beliefs, concepts to images, the rational to the irrational, politics to culture and so forth." If there is not this complementary, if only "one hemisphere" is working, then the left operates in a rhythm typical for "bureaucratic thinking" which accepts the function of paper logic as reality [6]. In a word, instead of the one-sided "politicized" thinking and the culture developed on its basis there should develop naturally a culture based on a pluralism of different value orientations. Culture (and morality as one of its component parts) exists in the form of a self-governing system which has very important attributes including self-preservation and self-development. Their manifestation is realized through the accumulating by the system (and its controlling bodies) of the necessary and sufficient information on what is happening in the environment with which the system interacts and about what is happening in the system itself. This is the conscious and self-conscious of culture. The former provides it with information on the external world, nature and society, while the latter reflects itself; thus each historical state and change in culture gains expression [7, p 27]. For determining the trends of the change it is essential to articulate the leading sociomoral values and ascertain the nature of their integrity and system organization.

Why is a new morality necessary? This requirement has been caused by the very social processes which have been brought to life by perestroika. The economy and social practices from the period of the extensive path of development have led to a situation where man has been completely "dissolved" in the production relations and the system of ensuing social structures, he has been

turned into a "cog" of production and has become a mere appendage to the physical elements of the productive forces. Because of this, creative and moral-psychological potentials have not developed but have been suppressed and this, in turn, has given rise to negative, antisocial phenomena, moral flaws and the alienation of the individual. Consequently, a restructuring of all aspects of the activities of society is impossible without providing a new content for a whole series of moral values which, having become reinforced in customary standards and principles of conduct, have become conservative stereotypes and in many ways alien to human nature itself, its social essence and purpose. These prevent the opening up of new economic, political and social trends.

Before acting as a value regulator of perestroika, the system of morality requires a profound reassessment corresponding to the spirit of the times. This can be carried out through various forms of the social organization of people, in being expressed in ideology, politics and social psychology. A thorough study of the mechanisms of this process can serve to elaborate the methodological basis of the entire problem related to a reassessment of our moral values.

For example, the overcoming of the "etatization" in a number of spheres of life of civil society contributes to an activating of its function and correspondingly to the appearance of new instruments of social regulation. It is a question primarily of such phenomena of a basic nature as the development of leasing relations, the collective and family contract, cooperative forms of production and services and individual labor activity. In being formed on the basis of social need without the dictating "from above," these require the appropriate political and moral regulators which would adequately reflect these needs, in harmonizing them with our priority sociopolitical and moral values, goals and ideals. It is essential first of all to overcome the alienation of people from the means of production and the results of their own labor. Alienation engenders social apathy and pessimism and at times it develops into social aggressiveness against persons of a different nationality, different social group and so forth.

The appeal to a sociomoral idea and one that is much more profound, meaningful and pluralistic than had been practices previously will serve as an alternative to the negative phenomena of socioeconomic reality. However, this must not be reduced to merely the correcting of the present as this is capable of leading to a separation of the proper from the real and to a social utopia; at the same time, these cannot also be considered identical. The transition from the ideal to the actual is carried out in the very process of the embodiment of historical necessity. A value orientation to an ideal requires a constant correlating of the decision being taken with the system of moral values existing in the conscience of man. Controlling behavior with the aid of a sociomoral idea provides significant autonomy of conscience from the conditions of everyday life and strictly utilitarian needs.

The sense of moral education is the inculcation in the individual of a profound inner drive for moral conduct. This is not caused by any motives except an insurmountable moral need and this is its enormous regulative potential. Here it is pertinent to quote the words of K. Marx: "...Ideas which take possession of our thoughts, which subordinate our convictions to themselves and to which reason chains our conscience—these are ties from which we cannot escape without breaking our heart, these are demons which a person can conquer only by submitting to them [8, p 118]. A moral need, being inseparably linked with a particular emotional state, becomes a counteracting force to strictly utilitarian needs. Truly moral conduct is selfless, it acts as an independent value and is carried out on the basis of individual choice. Currently, perestroika needs above all moral support from all the people. In our view, it is not to the point to strive mechanically for a greater politization of the masses and appeals for this we hear too frequently from the ideological workers. This will not raise the level of awareness but would rather cause resistance on the part of moral conscience.

A new analysis of the conceptual approaches to solving the problems of morality must play a major role. A reassessment of the very content of the basic ethical categories and concepts is extremely important for the perestroika processes or, as has been correctly pointed out, having recognized and repeated many times that our goal is man, we have become bogged down on this recognition [9, p 61]. Man is primarily the authentic creator of morality, the initial value and ultimate goal of the functioning of the moral system. In this context the ideological function of moral awareness is of particular significance and until recently this was viewed as somehow outside the basic problems of Marxist-Leninist ethics. In actuality, precisely the leading value-orienting line belongs to it [the ideological function]. It must be scientifically elucidated in studying the ways and methods of realizing the ideological potential of morality in the course of perestroika. The ideological function should not be introduced from the outside into ethics and which has been assigned a propaganda purpose, but rather from within, in a natural manner penetrating the entire categorical apparatus, that is, it is a question of the ideological level of moral conscience and its value models.

Only a comprehensive approach to the reassessment of moral values taken in their organic unity with the development of social processes and realized by such sciences as philosophy, sociology, ethics, aesthetics, social psychology, the study of culture and history, can achieve the realization of the truly noble notion of humanizing the entire social milieu surrounding us.

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- The "Futurophobia Effect" in the Ordinary and Bureaucratic Minds**
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- [Article by Igor Vasilyevich Bestuzhev-Lada, doctor of historical sciences and sector head at the Sociology Institute of the USSR Academy of Sciences. He is a permanent contributor to our journal]
- [Text] **The Rejection of a "Different Future"**
- Our research group for the first time encountered this phenomenon not in theory but in practice over 20 years ago, in 1969, in sounding polls of the public and experts in the course on working on the research project "Forecasting Social Requirements of the Youth." The project in its theoretical-methodological and procedural-technical part was aimed at working out sociological methods in the forecasting of social phenomena on the boundary line of forecasting and sociology which at that time were significantly alien to one another. Social needs were selected as the object of the research because they made it possible to conduct simultaneously both exploratory and normative forecast studies. As for the object of research, this was the youth and this was done not only because as is said now the sponsor of the project was the Komsomol Central Committee but primarily because the youth was the most dynamic social group in terms of ideology. In comparing the answers of students, the working youth and young intellectuals, we were hoping to learn much more about the expected and desired changes in needs than we would if we questioned persons of middle and particularly elderly age groups as the established stereotypes of thinking could prevent their

mental "traveling to the future" which would be essential for answering the questions on coming changes in needs.

To our amazement, the replies of the young respondents to the questions of a hypothetical nature (such as "What is your attitude toward such-and-such change in the ordinary state of affairs?") to almost 100 percent showed that those questioned automatically shifted the current state of affairs even to the distant future and only with certain desired quantitative changes (more than customary housing area, more diverse and cheaper food products and goods, more accessible trips to vacation homes, one or even better two vehicles for each person so desiring and so forth). Any possible radical changes in the way of life (let us assume, a minimizing of transport with obligatory pedestrian accessibility for areas of work, purchasing and amusement or a 20-hour workweek using the remaining 20 hours of the current workweek for ongoing education, for caring for patients in medical facilities, for organizing meaningful leisure, for assisting the teacher in extracurricular work, for protecting the environment but certainly with the corresponding level of labor productivity) were met with perplexity by virtually all those questioned and rejected out of hand.

Generally such a result is envisaged by forecasting theory and is termed "relapses of presentism of primitive thinking" [1]. It has been established that initially a person for a long time considered the present and the future completely identical, that is, he viewed any future as an infinitely continuing present without any substantial changes (and even before there was no past, present and future for him, everything was "of the moment" as in animals). It would be an exaggeration to feel that modern man in these terms has gone very far from his primitive ancestor. On the contrary, he is inclined to view the ever-so distant past of future in the features of the present which are customary for him. It has long been known that any fantasy is merely various combinations of different traits of the customary terrestrial and nothing more. Even such "other worlds" arising out of the human imagination such as paradise or hell are merely a simplified projection of notions concerning a "good life" or "suffering" as these have been shaped on the basis of the experience in life during the various centuries. Talk about communism or about the 21st Century with a senior grader, a student or even a scientific worker (but not a specialist in forecasting). Most probably you will obtain the mirror image of today possibly slightly idealized or, on the contrary, somewhat dramatized and that is it. In a word, you will obtain "presentism."

Experience shows that "presentism" passes as one becomes familiar with forecasting or at least science fiction literature. This is why contemporary respondents are less "present-oriented" than 20 years ago.

The amazing thing in the answers of the respondents was not the expected "presentism" but rather something else.

In attempting to introduce the respondent to the unfamiliar world of a "different future" in virtually all instances there was a categorical rejection of any future which qualitatively differed from the present. The more apparent and radical the qualitative difference (the quantitative was perceived rather easily), the more categorical the rejection and the hostile attitude. Such a position was clearly recorded among the working and student youth as well as among young specialists (we would emphasize that the poll was taken in Dubna, an elite scientific center of those times and it would have been difficult to find a broad audience that was more responsive to the problems of the future). Generally, the poll led to a zero result and we were forced to give it up.

We endeavored to compensate for the failure of the sounding poll of the Dubna respondents by a similar poll of Moscow experts who were scientific workers and who by the very nature of their activities would be "prone" to look at the future (let us recall that forecasting in the USSR which was only semilegalized in 1966 and was completely crushed several years later, during the period of stagnation was living through a stage of development which is continuing, incidentally, even now and forecasting literacy of even scientific workers was close to zero). We knew about the conservative thinking of the scientists, we were wagering on their age and more precisely on the "age nostalgia for the past" which is so often encountered among persons of elderly or even partially middle age. Certainly all the questioned experts were in these groups as there were no young experts, since virtually all the scientists under the age of 33 or even under 40 (except for an insignificant number of those who had been able to defend their doctoral dissertation) quite wrongly are considered to be "young scientists," or professional graduate students. All the same, we expected answers which differed from the answers of the "regular" respondents.

And in actuality, when it was a question of routine problems or processes occurring at the present, the experts unfailingly were up to it, differing for the better from the "simple" respondents. But when the issue was raised of a "different future," the answers of both were indistinguishable with the same relapse of presentism and the sharp rejection of any imposing of a "different future." Initially, we decided that the composition of the experts had been unsuccessfully chosen and we changed the sample twice but with the same results. In truth, it was discovered that if sufficiently qualified experts are for a long time "introduced to the future," then in them there is a sort of "self-instruction" and they gradually begin to delve more profoundly into the prospects of the examined phenomena. But, in the first place, we did not have the time to create such an atmosphere in the expert group. Secondly, even with the success of such an undertaking this would have been, in essence, a qualitatively different group which had been artificially established by us and did not reflect the level and character existing at that time of the expert assessment of the examined problem.

Let us recall, in order to avoid confusion, that this was in 1969-1970. Since then the face-to-face and written, individual and collective polls of experts for forecasting purposes have become a common phenomenon, the forecasting literacy of the experts has risen and at present such a poll would seemingly succeed to some degree. But 20 years ago, the polling of experts collapsed completely and we are not certain that with the greater complexity of the poll today's experts would be up to it and in no way because of an insufficient level of their skills.

As is known, a negative result in scientific research is also a sort of result which prohibits others from repeating the error which knowingly would lead to a failure and forces the search for other ways to resolve the problem. Thus our research group, having joined the social psychologists, found a way out of the situation. Instead of the ineffective "head-on" hypothetical polls, we resorted to psychological tests which had been specially modified for the needs of sociological research with a forecasting focus and to qualimetric assessments of the obtained data making it possible to provide general trend assessments of the expected and desired changes in the social demands of the youth while the experts were assigned a role of analyst which was more suitable to them. The results of the research were published [2].

Our research had one other side effect and this was to force us to be more profoundly concerned for the reasons and particular features of a categorical rejection of a "different future" by our respondents, not excluding the experts. The problem was repeatedly discussed and additional literature was studied. As a result there was born the concept of "futuorophobia" or an organic rejection by a person without any special forecasting training of any notion concerning a qualitatively different future. If this effect tells negatively on goal setting, planning, the pre- and postplanning programming, designing and routine management decisions which are not of an innovative character, for innovations it is reflected in the most lethal and catastrophic manner for them. And if the "futuorophobia effect" must be considered in the goal-oriented, planning, programming, design and organizational forecasts, in innovation forecasting it is one of the fundamental (like the "Oedipus effect" in technological forecasting) and without considering this any attempt at a forecasting basis for any substantial innovation, we are convinced, is doomed to failure. Particularly so in the sociosphere

The Genesis of Futuorophobia

All 40,000 years of the existence of *Homo sapiens* (according to certain data, much longer), human society was in a state strikingly different from today's. This state was called a matriarchate, a patriarchate and then individual stages of its development was savagery, barbarianism and civilization. These are divided into several socioeconomic formations and a multiplicity of varieties of a social system. However, the primitive community and, we would say, the English, German and French

countryside of the 18th Century, the Russian countryside of the 19th and the beginning of the 20th Centuries, the Latin American, Asian and African countryside of the first half of the 20th Century (and partially including small towns and the outskirts of large ones) were united by a disappeared or now disappearing stability and ossification of the social orders. The English small towns and later the countryside began to emerge from this state only at the end of the 18th Century, the French did this over the 19th Century, while the other Western European and Japanese from the second half of the last century and at the beginning of the current one, the Russians from the second half of the 20th Century while the Latin American, Asian and African ones are just beginning to develop this process.

One has merely to recall that at the end of the 1920s, 82 percent of our nation's population lived in a rural locality and 10-12 percent still in peasant huts in small towns or in the outskirts of large ones. By the middle of the 1950s, the figure was respectively 55 percent and the same 10-12 percent (until the start of the mass construction of five-story standard apartment buildings). And a majority of the remaining population originated from those same huts and hovels, with the same social psychology, with the strongest vestiges of domestic patriarchy, with all the characteristic traits of a traditional rural way of life and with the same attitude toward surrounding reality

The state of society which preceded today's was characterized by exceptionally high resistance to any innovation. This caused such great stability in society and a succession of orders predominating in it and which for an extended time moved from generation to generation virtually unchanged. And although one can clearly trace a tendency for a gradual rise in the scale and pace of the changes and an "acceleration in the social time of people" (and during the 19th and in the first half of the 20th Centuries, the acceleration was ever-stronger), these changes were nothing in comparison with those which have occurred increasingly over the postwar decades.

For many important parameters, beginning with the fuel-energy and material-raw material base, industry, construction, agriculture, transportation and communications and ending with the family and generally the relations between the sexes, the youth way of life, the forms of spending leisure time, the manner of dressing and so forth, over the last 45 years there have been many more innovations in the life of the people, these have been more significant and broader than in any previous period of history, including the chaotic revolutionary ages. At the same time, it was precisely in the previous age that the currently predominant stereotypes were established in the minds of people, including such negative ones in relation to any innovations. This is a most complex and very acute sociopsychological problem.

Let us endeavor to seek out the sources for the strong resistance to virtually any innovations in the human mind

In our view, the prime factors are rooted in the relatively low development level of labor productivity and the ensuing necessity of an extreme effort to provide oneself with a minimum living and not to perish. Let us recall that the heavy physical labor of adults, and this was largely monotonous, lasted up to 16 hours a day as this was the limit of human endurance. At present, work of such a sort and duration in the developed nations of the world, including in the USSR, is inherent to workers and white collar personnel who have significant farmstead plots with domesticated livestock and poultry and this forces them as it were to double their working day. This is also characteristic of working mothers with young children, when the burden of taking care of the entire family rests completely on the mother. In both instances, the labor load is viewed as excessive. But relatively recently such a state of affairs was the social standard for a mass of people.

There is scarcely anyone who would voluntarily assume such a burden on their shoulders. This is why over an extended period of time rather permanent patterns were worked out for each labor operation following the criterion of the greatest efficiency of the latter, down to the most minute details and the deviation from which was considered reprehensible.

Analogous stereotype-rituals, following the criterion of the efficiency of the operations, were worked out in the sphere of domestic life and leisure, but here the element of irrationality dictated by the various aspects of the way of life, beginning with religious beliefs or borrowings and ending with local factors of a random nature, was much more significant.

Incorporated in the social mechanism for reinforcing the existing stereotypes of awareness and were a system of the social needs of the individual and primarily the need for self-affirmation, that is, respect from those around and on this basis for self-respect. As is known, this demand becomes the strongest when the fundamental needs for self-preservation (food and so forth) are satisfied and at times it pushes the latter into the background. And as self-affirmation is easiest to achieve in closely following the existing stereotypes and decisively condemning any deviation from them, it is not hard to imagine how fundamental can be the conviction of rejecting innovations and how militant can be the desire not to permit these.

Everyone remembers the more than 30-year struggle over women's slacks which has not even ended now. Although seemingly this certainly was no important innovation, nevertheless, it can serve as a typical example of the desperate resistance put up not only by the men but also by almost all elderly women as well as a majority of the middle-aged and even a portion of the youth.

Clearly with such an attitude in ordinary conscience a permanent stereotype cannot help but be reinforced of

rejecting virtually any "other future" and which would sweep away any innovations.

Such an attitude initially doomed human thought to stagnation and nipped in the bud any ideas capable of engendering innovations. If only these forces existed in society they inevitably would have doomed it to stagnation and rapid death. Fortunately, also characteristic of the human personality is a need for self-affirmation not only by the blind imitating of stereotypes but also due to the realization of social needs for the efficiency of one's activities, for accomplishments, for an ongoing improvement, rationalization of labor, everyday life and leisure, of all conditions of life and forms of activity as well as for creative labor, leadership, criticism of others, new knowledge and so forth. When these opposing forces offset one another there is no catastrophic collapse but the intensity of innovations is close to zero and this we have observed over the entire extent of human history right until recent times. Currently innovative forces are becoming stronger and as a result there is a rise in the pace and scale of innovations.

We should point out that the energetic agents of innovative forces are almost always a relative minority of the population, often individuals and even an individual. (In principle, an innovative potential to one degree or another is inherent to each person but in virtually all this is suppressed by the dominance of customary stereotypes.) And while at present an innovator or a handful of innovators more and more often is able to handle the routine and make headway with the innovation, this is only because they rely on innovative mechanisms which are levers for the realization of innovations.

There is one other aspect related to an organic rejection of innovations by ordinary consciousness and which moves to a close to instinctive repulsion for any "different future." This is linked to the historical experience of mankind for the hundred or thousand ideas promising various goods in the instance of realizing the corresponding innovations, only one is actually constructive and more often not quite in the same way as its initiator imagined. So be it, that is the path of progress. As for the remainder, they upon inspection are either unrealistic or even worse they are socially harmful, detrimental or lethal, that is, with those same good intentions which, as is known, pave the road to hell.

The clearest example of this is the history of socialist thought from the times of the Renaissance until our own times.

If human perception is likened to a sort of "population of ideas," then routine thoughts are similar to "normal individuals" of such a population while innovative ones are similar to mutants. The more original the idea the more repulsive the "mutant" seems to normal individuals and their revulsion to this is completely rational since the mutant is a monster the offspring of which, if he is allowed to breed, can lead to the death of the

corresponding population. Is this not our attitude toward monsters and the feeble minded, do we not fear their breeding?

However, it is just as well known that mutation (of course, not any but rather an optimum one for the altered conditions) is the engine of progress. If there had not been mutation, the organic world of our planet would have remained stuck on the level of some single-celled algae.

All the same, any mutant is a freak which threatens the existence of the strain. For this reason, in any event, the attitude toward mutants is actively negative. That very spermatozoid which is to fertilize the egg must make a very great effort to outdistance the others and show his superior genetic properties capable of being inherited. According to this rather vivid, in our view, analogy, an idea which gives rise to an innovation which is actually not lethal but rather positive and constructive should without fail undergo the harshest possible testing and withstand the test of rejection. And if it successfully overcomes this, it is hence viable.

Such a philosophy is very disheartening for innovators as it means for a majority of them the humble path of Jesus Christ (who also proposed, as is known, very major innovations and, as it was to turn out, not only for his times). But what is to be done? And even if in the harsh atmosphere of rejection of the new destructive and lethal innovations still make headway (we have merely to recall the easily available types of drugs), it is not hard to imagine what would happen if man joyously welcomed any proposed innovations, so to speak, out of hand.

Incidentally, the history of our country over a number of recent decades has shown the world a sufficient number of very vivid examples of precisely what happens when a scarcely born innovation without the slightest critical perception is welcomed "by a storm of applause turning into an ovation."

Two conclusions stem from the phenomenon described by us of "futuorophobia" in the ordinary mind:

1. "Futuorophobia," in a certain sense, plays a positive role in the culling of ideas (usually of a predominant majority or virtually all ideas of one or another sort) capable of leading to the engendering of innovations which are dangerous or lethal for society. And since innovative forces at present are significantly stronger than they were before, and since they more and more often successfully overcome the saving "futuorophobia effect" for society, artificial mechanisms are needed which would simulate an innovation for "strength testing" or more accurately for design efficiency. In these mechanisms of important significance are the various methods of "weighing" the consequences of the intended or in-the-works innovations.

2. "Futuorophobia," if things are allowed to run their course and events develop spontaneously, is still sufficiently strong to suppress any innovation. Here it is not

to be excluded that precisely the constructive and the positive will be suppressed and the way opened for the dangerous, the lethal. Thus, artificial mechanisms are essential which prevent routine thinking from nipping a constructive innovation in the bud. For this, in the first place, it is essential to learn how to separate the wheat from the chaff, that is, the potentially constructive innovations from those potentially destructive for society. Secondly, we must learn to protect the emergent constructive from the dominant routine. In both instances, the "weighing" of the positive and negative consequences is capable of playing a beneficial role. But under one condition: clear theoretical views which take into account the complex dialectical nature of the "futuorophobia effect" in the ordinary mind.

Futuorophobia and Innovation Policy

In history one can trace a dramatic and possibly even tragic pattern. It is enough for any tribe, nationality or large people to halt their expansion, to become content with what has been achieved and switch to a routine way of life without any innovations which encourage the vital activities of people when they are immediately swamped by a wave of expansion by tribes and peoples who have not yet switched to the desired routine and still show dynamism in their sociopolitical life. In turn, as soon as this "wave" becomes a "swamp" the next wave sooner or later engulfs it and so on without end.

There are only two ways to get rid of this lamentable plight: either to retreat to the periphery, to inaccessible places which are also very harsh in their natural conditions or to become part of the waves of expansion which roll one upon the other in nonviolent, "peaceful" floods.

It would be rash to assert that all such processes are a matter of the past. At present, we are the witnesses of how analogous conflicts arise throughout the entire enormous expanse of the so-called Third World, particularly in Africa, in the Near, Middle and Far East, in truth, on a much smaller scale than before. But the gap between the "first" and "second" world of the developed countries, on the one hand, and the Third World, on the other, is growing, the problems of vital resources (food, power and raw materials) are rapidly becoming exacerbated and if the movement for peace, the curtailing of the arms race and the converting of the military-industrial complexes with the priority given to satisfying the urgent needs of people do not provide tangible results in the immediate next few years, then we cannot exclude relapses to the past in the most diverse varieties and scale.

The described phenomenon gives rise to a complex dialectics of the historical process.

On the one hand, no expansion can be eternal. Sooner or later, it encounters an obstacle either of a natural sort (the coast of an ocean or impassable mountains) or a social one (a repulse by a stronger neighbor). Moreover, also felt is the phenomenon noted by L.N. Gumilev with any expansion the young people perish first without

leaving offspring; as a result there is a substantial change in the gene pool and instead of the unusually fierce Normans or the Mongol Hordes there appear highly peace-loving Norwegians, Danes, Swedes and modern Mongols [3]. Incidentally, the peoples of our nation, and many other representatives of the "world system of socialism" also experienced a similar fate, only not as a result of external expansion but rather a sort of "inner expansion" of Stalinism and its varieties. In truth, those who perished were not the most "militant" and "active" but the most intellectually creative and respectable; to put it mildly, far from the best survived.

On the other hand, the halting of expansion without the diverting of the social activeness of people to some object (it makes no difference which) inevitably leads any society into the swamp of stagnation, to stagnation and catastrophe. Even if it is possible to seal oneself off from external expansion by a wall and organically incorporate any new arrivals in one's culture, the end result will be the thousand-year Chinese Empire which over the centuries tortuously fell apart in internal clashes and without fail became fair game for other predators.

Thus, equally impossible and fatal for society are both an infinite expansion (let us repeat, it makes no difference which) and its halting, stagnation and standstill.

What social mechanisms has society evolved in order to overcome this dialectical contradiction? There are two of them: innovation and antinnovation (in the broad sense the concept of "innovation" extends to any change in the conditions of society's activity). Each mechanism, in turn, breaks down into two: the "ordinary" or noninstitutionalized and the institutionalized.

It is advisable to see how the latter interacts with its "counteragent" and which constantly impedes this. The designated mechanism is so complex that a special study would have to be devoted to it. But it does have a fundamental feature which determines all the rest. This is bureaucracy or more precisely bureaucratic thinking which exists in a close linkage with the ordinary conscience of society's members.

Research on the bureaucracy has shown that it should not be reduced to a narrow group of "bad" officials engaged in red tape for their own selfish purposes [4]. No state can exist without a bureaucracy (professional managers). In the narrow sense, bureaucrats are the agents of the bureaucracy and they endeavor to pursue personal interests, placing these above the interests of society and hiding behind departmental, local and other interests. In this sense they are inseparably linked to the monopolizing of all and everything and they are fundamentally antinnovative due to the nature of their activities and the ensuing psychology.

Let us examine the particular features of a bureaucrat's activities. The ultimate goal of his activities is, in the first place, the preservation of the achieved position, secondly, the strengthening of the latter and, finally and thirdly, a rise in his status and related formal prestige.

All the rest is essential verbal camouflage. Otherwise a bureaucrat ceases to be a real bureaucrat.

For achieving the goal, the bureaucracy needs a permanent hierarchy which excludes the risk of ongoing struggle for one's position and spontaneous changes which are capable of leading to the loss of this. Any establishment of a bureaucracy is inseparably linked to the appearance and strengthening of such an hierarchy. One has merely to refer to the historical experience of our country during the years of Stalin, Khrushchev and Brezhnev. At the same time, hierarchy engenders monopoly in its every cell: any undermining of monopoly inevitably undermines the hierarchy itself. In turn, the monopoly is in principle hostile to any innovation, as that potentially threatens its very existence. And the suppression of innovation inevitably leads to stagnation, degradation and death. Thus, any monopoly gives rise to stagnation, rot and decay. It is no accident that even where the monopoly is seemingly triumphant (for example, under the conditions of monopolistic capitalism), in the interests of stabilization and amelioration and the renewal of society, antitrust legislation is worked out, the creation of supermonopolies (above a government-determined limit) is prohibited and innovative activities are encouraged.

As soon as the activities of society, in the sense of demonopolization and debureaucratization, lessens or is nullified, the growing bureaucracy inevitably gives rise to an equally growing monopoly, which in turn, reinforces the bureaucracy.... And so on, up to the point of stagnation and crisis. Thus, at the basis of the antinnovation mechanism lies the cumulative effect when one process in a way "nudges" another, that creates conditions for the growth and acceleration of the first and so forth.

The recent history of our country can serve as an illustration here. Seemingly, what could be more rational and more constructive than concentrating the production of motor vehicles or tractors of one type at one large enterprise; subordinating all enterprises of one sector, all inventions and discoveries in the nation to one department; to concentrate all research on the given scientific problem in one institute, department or sector; to bring together all talented writers in one union and all talented composers in another? But what has happened? Complete monopolization is worse than under any monopolistic capitalism. A monopolistic enterprise producing motor vehicles, without fearing any competition, has "spontaneously suppressed" all possible design improvements in its product while prices for it have remained monopolistically arbitrary. As a result, our motor vehicles are worse and more expensive than anywhere else. The monopolistic department has behaved as a predator, in constantly increasing prices, in destroying the environment in every possible way and eradicating whenever possible any likely competition in the bud. Thus, the monopolistic department for inventions and discoveries has done everything possible to erect insurmountable barriers on the path of inventions and discoveries; the

monopolistic scientific research institute, department or sector, in seeking self-preservation, has suppressed any fresh thinking with extreme severity. The monopolistic union of writers has turned into a board for persecuting dissidents and the greatest advantage has been gained by those who seized administrative power in it; we have observed the truly catastrophic consequences for literature. The same thing has happened with the remaining so-called creative unions.

The negative effect of monopoly undoubtedly would be felt even in a democratic society. But in a totalitarian state, this naturally is multiplied by 10-fold. Bureaucracy, as we have said, has brought, in turn, the monopolizing of all and everything to previously unprecedented extreme limits.

We do not intend to analyze the particular features of the system of bureaucratic centralism as it has developed in the nations of the "world socialist system" over past decades. Let us rather examine the attitude of *monopolistic bureaucracy* to innovations.

While in the ordinary mind futurophobia arises somehow instinctively, as one of the instruments for preserving saving rituals (traditions, mores, customs which stabilize society) and as one of the means of insurance against lethal innovations, in the bureaucratic mind futurophobia logically derives from an awareness of the danger of a "different future" for the bureaucrat and primarily his desire to hold an even higher position in this system. In other words, ordinary conscience is hostile to innovations and generally to a "different future" as if subconsciously as it easily surrenders to one or another innovation when the latter is offered as a fashion, or in a situation of mass psychosis, agitation or hysteria. On the contrary, the bureaucratic mind is hostile to a "different future" and the related innovations in principle, in a profoundly conscious manner and for this reason a struggle develops not for life but for death.

Over the centuries of its existence the bureaucratic mind has developed three very effective methods of combating innovations.

The most primitive and the least effective but all the same workable is *direct suppression*. The methods involve red tape, prohibition, defaming the personality of the innovator, representing him and his ideas in the form of a threat to the interests of the broadest possible range of persons. In our experience there are infinite specific examples of this. One has merely to refer to the history of any major innovation in any area of society's activity, particularly an innovation which was left unrealized, regardless of its obvious constructiveness.

Another much more effective method is the *discrediting* of the innovation by reducing it to the absurd, by profaning it, vulgarization and pseudorealization. There are many examples here. Can such important social innovations as the combating of drunkenness and alcoholism in 1985, the combating of unearned income in

1986 cause any other attitude but unconditional approbation? And how did they begin to carry out these innovations? Naturally, in a bureaucratic manner. The result in all instances was the discrediting of the innovation and its ultimate failure with obvious harm for society but with the greatest benefit for the omnipotent ruling bureaucracy which each time strengthened its positions.

An even more effective method is the *simulation* of innovations without touching the positions of the bureaucracy. Here even the abandoning of "futuresphobia" and the recognition of the concept of a "different future" are admissible. But this is a future which is the mirror image of the present and differs from it only in quantitative or minor details. A classic example was the notion of "communism 1980" announced with great fanfare at the beginning of the 1960s. (This concept, regardless of its obvious flimsiness even in the mid-1960s, officially "went on working" to the mid-1980s and unofficially, with certain adjustments, has continued to remain in effect until recently.) The vivid examples of bureaucratic social quasi-innovations are the founding of Gosagroprom [State Committee for the Agroindustrial Complex], the volunteer people's public order squads in their current form, supposedly cost accounting and so forth, and so forth. All of this distracts from the truly essential innovations and maintains the status quo for the ruling bureaucracy.

The overall conclusion from a description of the "futuresphobia effect" in ordinary and bureaucratic conscience and the ensuing rejection of innovations essential for social production and society as a whole is that this effect must be taken into account and without fail considered in innovation policy and in the realization of specific innovations. Without this, the risk of suppression, discrediting and simulation increases a hundred-fold. It is also essential to work out and improve institutionalized innovative mechanisms which are capable of minimizing the "futuresphobia effect" in society, to neutralize the conservative forces and optimize the procedures for the genesis, selection and implementation of innovations.

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A Specialist in a Cooperative in the Science Sphere

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[Text] In an analysis of any social object or process, it is essential to distinguish the idea from its embodiment. It is a valid idea of setting up a cooperative sector in the economy where the importance of personal involvement in the results of one's labor would be sharply increased.

But the embodiment of this idea in life has engendered problems related to the absence of state control over their activities in the interests of society and the absence of an analysis of the social consequences at the given time and under the given circumstances, with the exception of the general thesis sounding in the mouths of the defenders thus: "Yes, cooperatives lead to increased property and social stratification in society but, in the first place, it is essential to do something to escape from the crisis; secondly, the cooperatives include active, energetic and enterprising persons; thirdly, the alternative to the cooperatives is universal equality in poverty and who wants that?"

The attempt to analyze the social consequences from the activities of the cooperatives has encountered fierce resistance from their supporters who tolerate no criticism and do not even endeavor to analyze the negative aspects of this movement. This does harm to the cooperative movement since it eliminates an objective and thorough assessment of its activities out of hand.

In the given article an attempt has been made to analyze one type of cooperative, in the science sphere, where they have become significantly widespread. The necessity of organizing them under the institutes was dictated, in the first place, by the impossibility within the state sector of resolving many economic, scientific-production and service tasks and, secondly, by the necessity of restraining the stream of engineers, designers, scientists and workers who are capable and ready for independent activities and who are rushing to the cooperatives from the large enterprises and institutes.

Since the cooperatives in the science sphere represent an alternative state form of the organization of labor, it is important to analyze the social problems related to the use of specialists in them.

Research Methods

The sociological study conducted in one of the Moscow rayons in 1989 was an exploratory one aimed both at studying the social aspects of the labor activities of the specialists in cooperatives in the science sphere as well as working out the methods for studying them.

In the research the basic methods were employed for collecting social information:

a) Analysis of documents, including a study of the decrees of the USSR Council of Ministers, the instructional documents (forms of bylaws, requests, reporting and so forth), statistical data concerning the activities of the cooperatives and an analysis of the documents of the raykom and rayispolkom for the cooperatives;

b) Firsthand observation in attending the work of the rayispolkom commission for registering the cooperatives, attending the party raykom at meetings for workers of cooperatives in the science sphere, participating in the activities of the raykom working group on the problems of developing this type of cooperative;

c) Informalized interview with chairman of cooperatives of the science sphere (five persons);

d) A questionnaire of the cooperative workers including 50 persons (random sample), co-workers of scientific research institutes which are the guarantor enterprises with 154 persons (proportional sampling), and the members of the party committees and buros of the same institutes (53 persons, complete poll).

Personnel From Cooperatives in the Science Sphere

The research showed that very skilled specialists worked in the cooperatives. A predominant majority of them had a higher education and a quarter was doctors and candidates of sciences. Virtually all of them work in cooperatives in the same specialty as at the institute. The demographic portrait of a cooperative member is characterized by the following data: age (42.7 years) a little higher than for science as a whole, a significant portion of pensioners but at an age close to the borderline, that is, up to 60 years; among the cooperative members, in contrast to scientific workers, there were virtually no single persons and the average family size was 3.7 persons; there were very few women.

The results of the work done by any organization depend upon its personnel. At present, the cooperatives do not experience any lack of persons desiring to work. It is not merely a matter of high earnings but also opportunities for the specialists to earn legally enough to provide themselves and their families with a sufficient standard of living, using their knowledge, abilities and skills in this. Persons request working in a cooperative and in any position. But virtually everywhere this is temporary work (under labor agreements) and they are less willing for permanent employment fearing that the cooperatives will close down. The leaders of the cooperatives themselves also are forming a personnel pool, in giving the same assignment to two or three workers at the same time, feeling that this is economically advantageous as competition is created. On the one hand, this contributes to the more efficient and high-quality execution of the assignment and, on the other, makes it possible to test out the reserve of personnel in deed.

In selecting the workers the chief thing that is considered is professionalism. Also very important are high moral qualities such as honesty. In the opinion of one of the cooperative leaders, dishonest persons must not be allowed to taint the cooperatives. This opinion is understandable since at present for the cooperatives it is important that their image in public opinion be unsullied. Moreover, a common undertaking involving personal material interest is most effective only in an atmosphere of trust. The cooperative leaders also noted such qualities important for admission to the cooperative as initiative, efficiency, collectivism and work experience. In the talks none of them named other qualities and clearly for now they have too little importance for cooperative activities.

The rank and file cooperative members also feel that professionalism is a criterion for selection in admission to the cooperative (62 percent of those polled mentioned "work experience in the given area" and 52 percent mentioned "qualifications"). Great importance is given to professional qualities and to talent. In recruitment of less importance are industriousness and efficiency (it is clearly assumed that these will be apparent in the work process). Little importance is given to such sociopsychological personality qualities as the ability to make contact with others and affability. Virtually no importance is given to a sense of belonging. But in the view of co-workers from the institutes who are not cooperative members, the main thing in recruitment is activeness, initiative and then a sense of belonging, that is, the hierarchy of required qualities is somewhat different.

The views given by both the institute co-workers and the cooperative members themselves as to the qualities of a cooperative member as a worker were rather close. They considered the distinguishing feature to be a higher level of initiative, activeness and industry while knowledge, qualifications and abilities were basically the same. This shows that in a cooperative the activity properties of the individual are more vividly apparent as the cooperative form of the organization of labor provides an opportunity for these to be disclosed. At the same time, in terms of their intellectual potential, the personnel of the cooperative and the institute are virtually the same but the different forms of organizing labor in the first instance provide it with an opportunity to be manifested while in the second they are restrained.

In a larger portion of the polled cooperative members, the level of qualifications corresponds to the requirements of the job they are performing. The demands upon the level of qualification of the worker, in the opinion of $\frac{1}{2}$ of those polled, are the same both in the cooperative and in the institute; $\frac{1}{4}$ felt that they were higher in the cooperative and only 6 percent that they were higher in the institute.

According to the data of the polls of both the cooperative members and the institute co-workers, basically persons join the cooperatives in order to earn. At the same time, the cooperatives provide an opportunity for a person to

show his abilities and realize himself. Here personal, collective and social interests should be combined (and obviously are combined). The cooperative form for the organizing of scientific labor has potential to help a person realize himself and satisfy material needs, that is, do precisely what institutional science is unable to give him. But it is a different matter of how this potential is realized.

At present, it cannot be said that the best scientific minds work in the cooperatives. In the first place, this work, if it is additional and not the basic job, requires good health. Secondly, in public opinion, including in the scientific milieu, there is a rather widespread prejudice against cooperative activity (often having real basis). Thirdly, the cooperatives are basically aimed at carrying out narrow applied tasks and far from all the scientists can find employment there. Moreover, work in a cooperative often involves a change in the nature of content of the labor and not every person is capable of this adjustment.

A job in a cooperative for virtually all those polled is not the only place of employment since they are also engaged in an institute. Virtually all of them have a working day, including employment in the cooperative, of longer than 8 hours (the average duration is 11.2 hours). A third of them considers their job in the cooperative very pressured and an equal number rather pressured. However, the research disclosed that virtually no one intended to quit the cooperative. It is interesting that no one chose the proposed version of the answer: "I will work until I have acquired enough money for what I want to buy." This means that work in a cooperative is perceived as a method of satisfying long-term needs and not momentary ones.

Quitting a cooperative was rare and the reason for this was basically transfer to other cooperatives. No one mentioned disappointment in the cooperative activities. The difficulties in replacing departed workers, if they do occur, are related to the fact that it is not always easy to choose a good specialist. He usually does not encounter any obstacles in moving in his main job.

Among the institute co-workers, 40 percent of this questioned would like to work in cooperatives in the science sphere, an equal number could not make up their mind and 20 percent would not want to work in them. Precisely they provide an extremely negative assessment of everything related to the cooperatives.

At present, the cooperative members basically work in their specialty on the same or higher level of qualification than the institute co-workers.

On the question of qualifications, the problem arises of determining its conformity to the job performed. Sociological research carried out over a number of years in different regions of the nation has shown that certification in science when conducted formally and without objective criteria causes a negative assessment by a majority of the scientists regardless of the level of

glasnost and consideration of the cooperative's opinion. Virtually everyone polled in this research favored the abandoning of certification both in the institutes and in the cooperatives.

The lack of any need for certification in the cooperatives stems from the very nature of their activities, since it is simply disadvantageous to keep on an unfit worker and the labor collective will not allow this.

Time—Money? (Working Hours)

The working conditions in the cooperatives, in the opinion of their members, are basically either better or the same as in an institute. The organization of labor, including discipline, the use of working time and the level of leadership are significantly better in the cooperatives. At the same time, a misfortune in our science—the weakness of the physical plant—is also felt here. The supply of the cooperatives with modern technology and equipment, the availability of information are on the same level or worse than in the institutes while the supply of technical and auxiliary personnel is significantly worse. It can be concluded that the cooperative members achieve greater efficiency in their work by the better organization of labor and by attracting active co-workers, that is, in activating and stimulating the human factor since the physical plant is weak both in the institutes and in the cooperatives.

A series of sociological studies has shown that among workers in the science sphere there is a prevalent focus on creativity which under the conditions of the dominance of the command-administrative system in science assumed a distorted form. The constant diverting into nonproduction activities (facilities, construction projects) and the executing of work not corresponding to skills and frequently not relating to research created an acute psychological discomfort and led to a situation where the worker realized his creative potential and aspirations outside of the job. The subjectivism of the leaders, the pressure of the cooperative and the purposelessness of the work caused job dissatisfaction. And since scientific workers are basically creative persons with sufficiently developed individuality, they respond very acutely.

At present, the cooperatives operate under better conditions in terms of the utilization of working time. The cooperative members are not diverted to other measures. There are not the infinite inspections. In none of the studied cooperatives was there a single inspection by the guarantor enterprises. There were by the financial bodies but this was upon the initiative of the cooperative itself.

Nor were there the useless sessions or meetings. Once a week and in some cooperatives even more rarely, meetings of the board were held lasting 3 or 4 hours. In truth, there was not too much to do as the questions were settled within the cooperative subdivisions.

None of the chairmen could answer the question of how many days a month the personnel were absent from work

for valid reasons since no count was kept. If a co-worker was sick he carried out his job when he had recovered or it was turned over to someone else (correspondingly with pay for the work). In the science sphere such a principle of organizing labor when a task is set for a worker and a date determined for its realization is the most reasonable.

The maintaining of labor and production discipline is based upon the natural mechanism of personal interest and responsibility.

The workday for the cooperative members is increased by an average of 2 or 3 hours in addition to the 8-hour workday at the institute and the workweek by an additional 1 or 2 days (Saturday and Sunday). It can be said that the concepts of a "workday" and "workweek" does not exist in the cooperative as they work as much as is required. Such a situation, a first glance, makes it possible to utilize the labor resources with sufficient efficiency and carry out production tasks more quickly.

Wages

At present, the press is writing a good deal about the growing property differentiation in society and the sharp expansion of the number of persons having significant income.

The poll indicated that the principle "from each according to his abilities, to each according to his labor" had become profoundly rooted in the minds of people. Both among the cooperative members as well as among the institute co-workers, a predominant majority felt it just if wages corresponded to the results of labor no matter how much a person earned. But the results should be real and not based on the poverty of society or on shortages.

One of the factors which causes tension in the cooperative is the wages of the cooperative members. Information on this question is lacking. But here is how the institute co-workers assess the amounts of the wages for the cooperative members in the science sphere. They mention the most diverse amounts from 100 to 10,000 rubles a month. Only 22 percent of them feel that the wages conform to the principles of social justice, 24 percent to the labor invested by the cooperative members and 31 percent to the needs of our society. Basically they consider the amount of wages for the cooperative members to be inflated.

A difficult problem which influences both labor efficiency as well as the moral and psychological climate in the cooperative is a just determination of a worker's labor contribution, particularly under the conditions of cost accounting. In science the possibility of comparing the results of the labor of individual persons or subdivisions is extremely insignificant and this is grounds both for subjectivism and arbitrariness on the part of some

and dissatisfaction on the part of others. The cooperatives have also encountered this problem and for now are resolving it in the usual way of paying a wage plus a bonus for the work results.

This aspect in the activities of the cooperatives also has its drawbacks. Some of these are of a temporary nature and others are an inseparable feature. Among the former are the mismatching of the labor contribution and the wage. For the cooperatives in the science sphere this for now is less inherent than for the cooperatives in the other spheres of the national economy. But such a phenomenon does exist. This is related, in the first place, to the absence of a criteria for assessing creative labor and, secondly, to the ignorance or miscomprehension (in all spheres both state and cooperative) of just how much the labor of a specialist is worth (if this is actually labor and not merely remaining on the job "from 9 to 5"). For this reason, the cooperative leaders were asked in the interviewing to explain just what "unearned income" was. Once the client paid, this meant he was satisfied with the result of the labor at such a price.

At present, a ruble assessment is provided not so much for the labor of the cooperative specialists as it is for the scarcity of this labor and the remuneration of the cooperative member is the consumer value of his labor under the conditions of the absence of competition at the given stage of the existence of our society. A change in any of these components undoubtedly will tell on the wages of the cooperative members. At present, the wage range is very great, even within a single cooperative and according to the data of the research the ratio of the minimum and maximum wage can be 1:25.

The unexpectedly and spontaneously existing high incomes of the cooperative members have a number of consequences of a negative sort.

The first is the parasitism when the cooperative members are forced to maintain (or voluntarily maintain) in their ranks persons who do not work in the cooperative but have the potential of influencing the conditions of its existence, making them more or less favorable. This is a legal cover for bribery. This includes workers in material-technical supply, from the supporting ministries, the police, financial bodies as well as their own guarantor enterprises.

The second consequence is the appearance of deadwood, that is, persons who cannot or do not want to work but are the relatives or close acquaintances of "influential" persons who will be supported (and well) from the profits of the cooperatives.

It is correct but all the same useless to say that it is essential to fight against both the first and second phenomenon. At present these are the conditions for the existence of the cooperatives and these determine their way of operating. When the cooperatives become completely independent and require their own physical plant, then and then only it will be possible to eliminate the negative phenomena.

As a rule, the permanent members of the cooperatives hold managerial positions. Persons who have concluded a labor contract with the cooperative are directly involved in the production process. This bespeaks an incipient trend to employ a hired labor force, that is, exploitation. The possibility of this developing and existing can be seen from the ratio of the cooperative members and persons working under labor agreements which is 1:10 and often significantly more. All the leaders of the cooperatives have noted this phenomenon. At the same time, they have correctly pointed out that "shadow" exploitation also exists in the institutes when, for example, a scientific co-worker writes a dissertation for a leader or a whole series of co-workers prepares articles for him.

The ratio of the amounts of wages which the same worker receives in a cooperative and at the institute is unstable. Basically the wages of one person in the cooperative is equal to or less than his wages at the institute. At the same time, sometimes the wages in the cooperative are several times greater than the amount received at the institute. And here for him the work at the institute is not the main one but rather the job at the cooperative. Work at the institute assumes subordinate significance ("for a rainy day," suddenly the cooperative might be closed down, for receiving a pension, for prestige purposes and so forth). If this was not felt on the effectiveness of the work done by the cooperative member at the institute, this could be disregarded. But it is essential to consider the moral and psychological climate and the change in the attitude toward work on the part of other institute co-workers and colleagues of the cooperative member and which can be expressed in reduced satisfaction with their own labor and hence a decline in labor activeness. There can also be a deterioration of the moral-psychological climate (increased aggressiveness toward the cooperative members, on the one hand, and their own passivity in labor and social life, on the other).

Moreover, when the wage ratio in the cooperative and in science for the same worker surpasses the limits acceptable for the given moment, employment of the cooperative member at an institute loses any sense, both for himself and for society. But if the labor of a specialist is worth just as much as he receives in the cooperative, then why does he receive so little at the institute? On the other hand, if he is overpaid in the cooperative, from what and from whom does the money come?

The social consequences of a wage differentiation for workers working side by side are enormous. People have the right to know why such a difference exists in the payment for conscientious labor. If the labor of a cooperative member is socially necessary and currently in short supply and for this reason the high incomes are natural and just, that is one thing; but if, as it is sometimes explained to us, this is due to the fact that the noncooperative members are second-rate persons who are inactive, lazy and work halfheartedly, then this is something else, this is an immoral explanation of the

situation which destabilizes the labor sphere and humiliates our already too ill-favored worker.

Cooperatives and Society

As is known, the activities of cooperatives at present frequently evoke an extremely negative response. How characteristic is this for the cooperatives of the science sphere? The cooperative leaders with whom we were able to talk feel that the attitude toward them on the part of public opinion is as bad as it is for the remaining cooperative members. Society makes no distinctions, considering them all self-seeking. The financial bodies have the same sort of attitude toward them. The bank, for example, charges an additional tax on the cooperative for the state and this cannot be avoided. It is impossible to move to a different bank as then your own local bank "spoils life."

The cooperatives are a new form of the organization of labor. However, they have already demonstrated their right to exist. Both the cooperative members (virtually all of them) and the institute co-workers consider them more effective than the institute's. The main thing which the scientific co-workers expect from the cooperatives is the improved introduction of scientific developments and inventions into practice and greater efficiency in science.

The results of the polls have shown that the relationships between the cooperative and the guarantor enterprise have developed rather well. But ties with them should be based on the complete voluntariness of the cooperative (in the opinion of the cooperative members). The co-workers of the institutes feel that the impossibility of avoiding the use of the institute's scientific research accomplishments in the activities of the cooperatives organized under it necessitates greater legal protection for the developments and rights of the institute as well as publicity in the activities of the cooperatives. If the cooperative members use the institute's developments they should pay for them at contractual prices.

The cooperative members are aware that the regulating of their activities is essential and they have taken this into their own hands. Unions have arisen for the various types of cooperatives, including the scientific-production ones. As of now, it is hard to judge their effectiveness, however the need for association on the basis of common interests is caused by life itself. At present, the cooperative members, on the one hand, are uncertain that the cooperatives will exist for a long time and, on the other, are certain of the directly opposite development of events. This reflects the fluctuations in policy carried out vis-a-vis the cooperatives by the administrative bodies, in giving rise to instability in the status of the cooperative members, the instability of their views and hence their focusing on momentary advantages, on a drive for a lot of money and not on long-term goals.

Results and Proposals. The results of the research have shown that cooperatives in the science sphere have basically evoked a positive attitude from the scientists and engineers. At the same time, it is clear that the cooperative movement on the social level has both positive and negative aspects.

Among the former one can put the possibility of creating conditions for a natural combination of social, collective and personal interests of the workers and the satisfying of their material, spiritual and social needs. The other aspect which is attractive for the scientific workers is the possibility of self-realization and carrying out one's plans.

Also among the positive features is the fact that in the cooperatives the basic criterion for judging a worker is his qualifications and ability to work and not age, sex or other questionnaire data. This makes it possible for the cooperatives to solve (or more accurately ignore) the problem of older workers. In truth, on the other hand, the cooperatives thus do not train young people, preferring to receive someone "ready-to-go."

Among the negative features one must mention first of all the unannounced but still present dividing of workers into two types: the first who are the most active, enterprising and industrious who are cooperative members; the second who are all the rest who still are not working in the cooperatives.

This division of labor which is intensely propagandized by the mass information media and by the cooperative members themselves (or by persons related to them) is completely incorrect. For the cooperative members and scientists engaged in exploratory, fundamental research there is a different content of the labor, its goals and results. Our society will scarcely gain much if the talented scientists with a theoretical bent of mind leave fundamental science for the sphere of introducing applied developments in order to earn for themselves and for their families a worthy life. Clearly, some thought must be given as to how equal opportunities can be created for material support both in the state sector of science and in the cooperatives.

Those conditions which the cooperatives offer, including in the science sphere, create the possibility also for unhealthy phenomena (extortion, protectionism and bribery), that is, for "dividing" superincome. The very idea of a cooperative—and at the given stage this is inevitable—gives rise to the exploitation of the labor of others.

State regulation of the activities of the cooperatives is essential but presently everything is adrift. It is not merely a matter of taxation but rather the attempts to take over the carrying out of the obligations and functions of the state institutions by establishing cooperatives which do the things which the state institutions should do (but are not doing). The cooperatives seize initiative from them by using the beneficial conditions

for extracting personal income with the complete indifference or even the conniving of the state institutes.

Even the brief time that the cooperatives have existed in the science sphere indicates that in their activities there is much that is clearly usable in the work of the institutes. They complement one another in a number of ways. It would be reasonable for them to utilize each other's experience.

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The Residence Permit: Pro and Contra

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[Article by Boris Yuryevich Berzin, candidate of philosophical sciences and head of the Chair of Sociology and Social Psychology at the Sverdlovsk Higher Party School. Our journal has published his article "Professional Culture of a Party Worker" (No 3, 1989, co-author). Svetlana Gennadyevna Panova is a candidate of philosophical sciences and senior science associate at the Institute of Philosophy and Law at the Ural Department of the USSR Academy of Sciences. This is the first time she appears in our journal]

[Text] The passport and residence permit ["propiska"] are inseparable attributes of our daily activity. We have come to consider them an essential appurtenance of everyday life but far from everyone is aware that the regimentation expressed by them was introduced by a decree of the USSR TsIK [Central Executive Committee] and SNK [Council of People's Commissars] in December 1932 and was subsequently repeatedly supplemented and detailed by an entire series of subsequent enactments.

These basically "serf" documents limit the freedom of choice of place of residence and the sociolegal status of the citizens each of whom comes under the full control of the state. The subsequent clarifications and corrections ("status on passports" of 1953 and the decrees of the USSR Council of Ministers of 1961, 1974 and others) did not alter anything in principle.

Under the conditions of the radical transformations which had engulfed our society, the institution of the residence permit which in actuality is an instrument for regulating society's economic and social life by methods of administrative compulsion remains a still present reminder of the command and bureaucratic system.

A legal analysis discloses the discrepancy of this institution to the content of the international pacts on human rights allowing each person to move about freely and choose a permanent residence within his state as well as leave the country and come back. It does not agree with the USSR Constitution which proclaims the right of the Soviet citizen to choose the type of employment and

occupation in accord with his calling, abilities and professional training, the right to residence, the receiving of an education and the safeguarding of health.

In order to determine the attitude of various groups in the urban population to the problem of the residence permit, co-workers from the Laboratory of Sociopsychological Research at the Institute of Philosophy and Law of the Ural Department of the USSR Academy of Sciences in April 1990 questioned 519 inhabitants of Sverdlovsk. The plan of the sample was dictated by the research tasks: to ascertain both the general perception of the ruling called the residence permit as well as the sore spots and contradictions which it has caused. For this reason the sample included not only the main sociodemographic strata characterizing the population of a large city but also particularly isolated categories of citizens for whom the residence permit is an urgent matter. In comparison with the average statistical data, for Sverdlovsk we increased by 5-8-fold the groups of persons not having their own housing and permanent residence permission, those residing in dormitories or renting a "corner," as well as those simply present without any fixed place of residence (bums).

The problem of the residence permit in our view, is a very indicative object for studying the processes of the formation and functioning of public opinion, as it actually touches the interests of every person. This was also confirmed by the research results. Some 87 percent of the respondents were able to voice their personal attitude toward the residence permit and 7 percent considered it an empty formality while the remainder pointed out that the passport system has a marked impact on the activities of society.

How is this impact viewed? Some 14 percent of those polled felt that precisely due to the residence permit public order is ensured while 66 percent felt that it merely hinders people and sometimes can spoil a person's entire life.

The negative assessment of the residence permit is explained primarily by personal experience (a significant correlation was established according to a Kramer coefficient of -0.37). Some 53 percent of those polled "over a stamp in a passport" had experienced significant difficulties and conflicts in the course of finding a job, obtaining housing, establishing a family or receiving medical treatment. Among the "victims" there were almost 3-fold fewer persons who were of a positive or indifferent attitude toward the residence permit than in the group of persons who had not had a negative experience and there was double the number of those sharply critical.

Here are a few statements taken from the questionnaires: "For about 6 months I could not register my wife at our residence until we gave a bribe;" "My mother does not receive a pension as there was no job at the place of residence and where there was jobs there was not enough housing for registration;" "I could not register my son

who had returned from the army;" "Constant humiliation in front of the bureaucrats, beginning with finding a job and ending with the ration coupons."

What groups more often get into conflict situations involving the residence permit? There is a completely obvious correlation between the type of permit (or its absence) and the level of dissatisfaction with the passport system: among persons having a permanent residence permit, 50 percent of the respondents had difficulties and unpleasantness; among those having a temporary residence permit the figure was 55 percent; for those without residence permits it was 89 percent. In terms of sociodemographic characteristics, the most "conflicting groups" were persons from 25 to 49 years of age, with an incomplete secondary and higher education, white collar personnel, the nonproduction intelligentsia and bums.

The research reaffirmed a certain chaoticness and contradictoriness of the mass consciousness. As was pointed out above, a few of those polled see the residence permit as a certain mechanism which provides order in society, at the same time in the process of analyzing the positive and negative aspects of the residence permit, the number of its supporters doubled. One out of four was inclined to see in it a stabilizing factor guaranteeing a certain minimum of social protection and justice.

Among a certain portion of the population (38 percent) there still survives the illusory notion that precisely the residence permit helps to realize the right to housing, medical services, education and so forth and that at present it acts as a guarantee for the obtaining of at least the most essential goods (33 percent) and protects the regional "food basket" from others, impeding the spontaneous migration of people (18 percent).

All the same, a majority views the residence permit as a social evil, considering that it "limits the opportunity to choose a place of residence and freedom of movement" (74 percent), "it intensifies the feeling of complete dependence upon the authorities" (69 percent), "it keeps each person under the control of the state bodies" (62 percent) and "complicates free access to goods" (53 percent).

As is clear from the given figures, over $\frac{2}{3}$ of those questioned voiced negative judgments about the residence permit, while not more than $\frac{1}{3}$ noticed its direct negative impact on their lives. Judging from the answers, the existing residence permit system first of all does not allow them to freely dispose of occupied housing (46 percent), to receive medical treatment where it is more convenient and better (46 percent), to live in any city (43 percent), to find a job (33 percent) or go where they wish (30 percent).

"Must the residence permit be abolished?" Our respondents found it much harder to answer this question than merely to define their attitude toward the residence permit. The number of persons who refused to reply almost doubled and was 24 percent. Regardless of the

firmly expressed rejection of the residence permit, many in no way were insisting on its immediate abolishment. Some 13 percent were completely against abolishment, while 26 percent, on the contrary, favored immediate abolishment while the prevailing opinion was "the residence permit should be repealed when conditions have been created for this" (40 percent). In the distribution of the replies there was a restraint and caution among the urban dwellers, a contradiction between the understanding of the need for reforms and the fear of major changes.

It can be assumed that one or another position on the question of repealing the residence permit is determined by two circumstances. In the first place, by the actual situation in life in which a person is (the presence or absence of housing, the nature of its possession, the type of residence permit). Secondly by his political views and by general ideas of the processes occurring in the nation. On this level, the results obtained by us do not contain anything unexpected, in confirming the general dependences and trends which are presently apparent in virtually each study of public opinion.

Thus, favoring the retention of the residence permit system or the canceling of it, but under the presence of the corresponding conditions for this, are favored basically by elderly persons, workers and pensioners, as well as persons with an incomplete secondary or specialized secondary education. But the group of persons with a higher education, and particularly the nonproduction intelligentsia, is very negatively inclined (in the group with a higher education just 9 percent feel that the residence permits are indispensable, in comparison with 18 percent in the groups with an incomplete secondary and secondary education; favoring the immediate repeal of the permit are, respectively, 31 percent and 22 percent). Such a perception of the residence permit by the best educated part of the population is determined, of course, not only by the negative experience in life but also by a realization that the currently existing Regulation Governing the Passport System in the USSR and the Residence Permit Rules actually obstruct the realization of the most elementary human rights.

While a larger portion of those polled were able to define their attitude toward the residence permit and its abolishment, less than half was able to predict the consequences of such abolishment (45 percent); 17 percent proceed from the view that nothing would change here. Among those who did endeavor to concretize the possible changes, the "optimists" (56 percent) somewhat prevailed over "pessimists" (44 percent). The "pessimists" felt that in the event of the abolishment of the residence permit, prices for housing would rise on the black market (51 percent of those replying), the system for the allocation of apartments and commodities would be more complex (44 percent) and disorder in society would intensify (41 percent). The "optimists," on the contrary, hoped for the appearance of broad opportunities to realize rights and freedoms (61 percent), the disappearance of abuses related to the residence permit

(60 percent), and the rise of conditions for the development of market relations (41 percent). In analyzing the proposed consequences of the new situation, each group, naturally, viewed it from the viewpoint of their own political and economic interests and from the position of the understanding and analysis of social realities.

The conducted poll showed that, regardless of the overall negative attitude toward such a social phenomenon as the residence permit, for many it as yet does not represent a primary problem and is not fully recognized by them as an institution contradicting the USSR Constitution and encroaching on basic civil rights. Those decisively in favor of abolishing the residence permit were just those groups of the population which understand the real sense of the existing strictly regulated passport conditions and for whom this actually impedes a normal life. Among them are the most active and best educated portion of the population as well as persons who for various reasons have become the hostages of it, since they are unable to obtain either a job or housing without the sacramental note in their passport.

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Opinions of Delegates of the 28th CPSU Congress

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[Public Opinion Poll prepared by V. Boykov and Zh. Toshchenko]

[Text] For the first time in the history of the CPSU, at its highest forum a sociological group was organized and consisting basically of co-workers from the Center of Sociological Research of the Academy of Social Sciences under the CPSU Central Committee. It conducted five polls of the delegates and two nationwide population polls.

Below are given certain data from the three polls of delegates to the 28th CPSU Congress: on 1 July (on the eve of the Congress), 85 percent of the registered delegates was polled, on 6 July, 56 percent of the delegates was polled and on 13 July (on the concluding day of the Congress work) 49 percent of the delegates of those participating in the session were polled.

According to the data of the Credentials Commission, the Congress was attended by 4,683 delegates. Of this number, over 40 percent was party workers (including a quarter secretaries of the primary party organizations), around 17 percent was economic leaders of the various national economic sector. Almost 60 percent of the delegates was people's deputies and 17 percent workers and kolkhoz members. The questions asked and the wording of the replies to them are given as they appeared in the questionnaires. Answers are given in percentages of the number of persons polled.

Socioeconomic Orientation of Congress Delegates

How do you view the possible consequences of implementing the program to bring the nation out of the crisis as proposed by the government at the last session of the USSR Supreme Soviet?

Program is halfhearted	52
It will lead to chaos	25
It will radically improve the economy ..	11
Hard to answer	10

What is your attitude toward the private sector of the economy?

It should not exist	12
It should be allowed on a low level	72
It should prevail	11
Hard to answer	4

What is your attitude toward cooperatives?

Completely positive	4
Positive but not completely	61
Negative for a majority	26
Completely negative	7
Hard to answer	2

In moving toward a market, we are also moving toward a more complete realization of the possibilities of socialism

Completely agree	29
Rather agree than disagree	37
Rather disagree than agree	15
Disagree	10
Hard to answer	7
No answer	2

The changeover to a market economy cannot begin with a rise in prices

Agree	40
Certain rise in prices indispensable	38
Cannot be transition to market economy without increase in prices	18
Hard to answer	2
No answer	2

Sociopolitical Orientations of Congress Delegates

What problems in the life of society cause the greatest concern for you?

State of affairs in the party	62
Ways of carrying out economic reform ..	58
Course of perestroika as a whole	50
Interethnic relations and conflicts	47
Drop in prosperity of public	41
Political instability	37
Social protection of people	34
Crime	33
Educating of the youth	30
Morality in society	28
Ecological problems	25
Culture of the population	22

International affairs 6
(Several answers could be given. For this reason, total of answers is over 100 percent.)

All difficulties are blamed on perestroika but it cannot be asserted that all are. What we are currently involved with are the consequences of perestroika

Agree with this 41
Do not fully agree as I feel perestroika is still largely to blame 43
Disagree 14
Hard to answer 2

In society forces have appeared which impel us toward a bourgeois system

Yes, and they have a chance of success . 45
Yes, but they do not have support in society 46
I do not see such forces 4
Hard to answer 2
No answer 3

Whose interests should be in the forefront (have priority) in working out state policy?

Man 81
State as a whole 24
Peoples of republic (region) 7
Nation 3
Interests of classes 8
(Total of answers over 100 percent as it was possible to check several answers.)

What future of the USSR do you favor?

Federation of Union republics 70
Confederation of republics 11
Combination of both 14

Hard to answer 3
No answer 2

Do you agree that the changes which have occurred in international relations in recent years fully meet the interests of the USSR?

Only partially 50
Yes, completely 30
No 14
Hard to answer 4
No answer 2

Policy can and should establish a reserve of security in reducing military expenditures

Agree 84
Disagree 9
Hard to answer 3
No answer 4

Opinions on Problem Questions of Party Development

Party leadership bears responsibility for the deformations which have occurred in the nation but this in no way means the universal blame for millions of communists

Agree with this thesis 54
Do not completely agree, since a portion of the blame also rests on the regular communists 39
Disagree as each communist is responsible for decisions taken by the party 6
Hard to answer 1

How do you see the CPSU?

A party of consolidation of all strata of society supporting the ideas of socialism 80
Political organization of working class . 15
Hard to answer 5

What in your opinion is currently most important for strengthening the party?

	Poll on Eve of Congress	Poll After Congress
Consolidation of all currents within it	58	49
Purging of conservative	17	21
Purging of persons who do not believe in ideals of socialism	30	34
Hard to answer	3	1

(Total of answers over 100 percent as it was possible to check several answers.)

Only a party which is renewed, to the left and rejuvenated can lead the nation along a path of serious changes

Agree 83
Disagree 10
Hard to answer 4
No answer 3

Your attitude toward the principles of democratic centralism?

Keep but strengthen democratic principles in them 68
Switch to principles of democratic unity 22
They must be kept in an unchanged form 6
Hard to answer 4

What principle for the organizing of the party do you support?

Territorial-production	70
Let the decision be made by the communists where they are registered with the party	19
Territorial	8
According to interests of communists (creating of party clubs)	4
Not yet determined	1
(Total of answers over 100 percent as it was possible to check several answers.)	

To the question of whether or not there should be party organizations in production, the unanimous answer is there should be

I feel this way	81
I do not feel this way	15
Hard to answer	2
No answer	2

The party is not to intervene into the functions of the Soviet bodies. But this means that it is not responsible for those decisions taken without its consultation and has the right to publically criticize them

Yes, this should be the case	56
I do not particularly understand how this could be realized in practice	24
Nothing will ensue from this	16
Hard to answer	2
No answer	2

What, in your view, should determine the deputy position of the communists elected to a soviet?

Will of the voters	66
Program tasks of the party	45
Own vision of ways for solving urgent problems	20
By decisions of faction of communists who are members of soviet	9
(Total of answers over 100 percent as it was possible to check several answers.)	

Level of Satisfaction With Results of Congress Work

Are you satisfied with the results of the congress?

Satisfied	13
Not completely satisfied	60
Not satisfied	27

Are you satisfied with:

a) Program statement "Toward a Humane Democratic Socialism"?	
Yes, completely	9
More yes than no	56
More no than yes	27
Completely dissatisfied	6
Hard to answer	2

b) CPSU Bylaws?	Yes, completely	12
	More yes than no ...	56
	More no than yes ...	23
	Completely dissatisfied	6
	Hard to answer	3

c) Resolution on Political Report of the CPSU Central Committee?	Yes, completely	11
	More yes than no	48
	More no than yes	30
	Completely dissatisfied	8
	Hard to answer	3

d) Results of elections to central party bodies?	Yes, completely	12
	More yes than no	37
	More no than yes	32
	Completely dissatisfied	14
	Hard to answer	5

How do you assess the atmosphere in which the congress worked?

It was an acute but comradely discussion	14
Comradely for individual questions but not for individual others	52
Discussion often had a tactless character	34

What do you think about the possibility of maintaining party unity after the congress?

Unity has rather strengthened	20
Everything remains as before	20
Unity has weakened	38
A split is inevitable	19
Hard to answer	3

How will the work of the congress and its decisions influence the authority of the party in society?

Authority will grow	21
Will not change	38
Will decline	31
Hard to answer	9

What is your attitude toward the polls of congress delegates?

Sociological polls aid the work of the congress	57
They in no way influence the work of the congress	36
They harm the work of the congress	2
Hard to answer	5
No answer	2

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Leningraders: A Typology of Leisure

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[Article by Vladimir Vsevolodovich Prokofyev, candidate of economic sciences and sector head at the Leningrad Financial-Economics Institute imeni N.A. Voznesenskiy. Our journal has published his articles: "How Close-Knit and Conflicting Families Spend Their Free Time" (No 2, 1988) and "Free Time of Industrial Workers" (No 1, 1989)]

[Text] The fund of free time for the Leningrad population is over 200 million hours a week. This is approximately 25 percent higher than the fund of working time. The significance and amount of free time make it an object worthy of attention by a sociologist.

We asked the question: are not certain types of occupations during a period of leisure mutually attractive? As a rule, a person is limited in the choice of activities. Possibly he chooses these in a certain combination. Such

combinations are few in number and this makes it possible to carry out a unique typologization of leisure and determine the basic method of spending free time by one or another group of persons.

This complex question can be solved only by a computer which is capable of "going through" a mass of involved combinations of free time expenditures. The use of the main components method is based upon the procedure of locating the object of research in a certain system of coordinates (factors).¹ Below we describe the results of an analysis due to which it is possible to determine the basis of a complex type of spending leisure and how many such types were represented by the questioned Leningraders at the beginning of the 1980s.

A set of activity indicators was analyzed characteristic of the free time for 2,592 persons questioned. As a strictly specific type of activity, the list did not include activities with children as well as time expenditures on watching TV broadcasts or listening to the radio or a tape recorder. The latter indicator does not make it possible to "separate" the respondents in any manner as the entropy of the indicator is too high (see the table).

Factor Analysis of Types of Activity in Free Time (Rotated Solution Carried Out by Main Components Method)

Types	Factor Loads					
	Men			Women		
	I	II	III	I	II	III
Basic job	0.04	0.62	0.08	0.36	0.01	0.27
Study and self-education (at home)	0.08	0.79	0.03	0.82	0.20	0.03
Reading newspapers and magazines	-0.07	-0.08	0.75	0.84	0.01	0.77
Reading books	0.13	0.01	0.65	0.10	0.18	0.71
Receiving guests	0.54	-0.01	0.18	-0.04	0.69	0.05
Hobbies	0.21	0.30	0.29	0.14	0.01	0.38
Study in self-education (outside home)	0.06	0.75	-0.04	0.79	0.15	-0.02
Social work	-0.13	0.36	0.27	0.52	-0.17	0.17
Visiting	0.65	0.03	0.06	-0.05	0.69	0.13
Trips out of town	0.18	0.15	0.42	0.21	0.25	0.35
Visiting restaurants, bars	0.63	0.08	-0.03	0.32	0.53	-0.04
Walks within city	0.16	0.12	0.44	-0.13	0.18	0.30
Going to movies	0.63	-0.02	0.06	0.01	0.46	0.36
Going to theaters and concert halls	0.53	0.08	0.24	0.20	0.42	0.35
Total informativeness, %	13.8	13.1	11.5	13.8	13.2	13.1
Final informativeness, %		38.4			40.1	

The maximum factor loads make it possible to formulate the essence of the latent effect on the organization and spending of free time. The total informativeness points to the priority of the examined effect and determines what has the "stronger" influence. Activities having maximum values should be examined comprehensively as the manifestation of a single factor and the very

grouping of them indicates what types possess a reciprocal "social attraction." If it is known that a person spends his free time in a certain two types of activity of this mutually attractive group, then it can be said with a large degree of probability that in his leisure there are also other definite types of activity which dominate. Let us emphasize that it is a question precisely of the

prevalence of one group of activities over another and not the absolute use of types of activity which do not fall into the group characteristic of the given type of leisure. This is the basic difficulty of the typologization as it is very difficult to draw a clear line, although the "core" of the typology is beyond any doubt.

Let us see what determines the leisure forms in the first case (column I). In males, there is a prevailing orientation for receiving guests (0.54), visiting acquaintances and relatives (0.65), there is an interest in the cultural life of the city, in the theater (0.53) and new movies (0.63). Representatives of this group actively go to restaurants and bars (0.63). We determine this group of activities as a consequence of an increased desire for human contact. The latter, no matter what the remaining influences, performs the leading role and total informativeness (13.8 percent) is in first place although it does not greatly exceed the nearest indicator (13.1 percent).

For women, in the corresponding column there is a noticeable increase in the indicator for study and self-education under home conditions as well as also outside of the home. There is a high factor load for social work (0.52). An intermediate position is held by attending theaters, trips out of town and visits to restaurants. Receiving guests and visiting are markedly reduced. There is no interest in movies. Such a method of spending time, in our opinion, is characteristic of those who are concentrated on cognitive activities. The leisure of women in this group is determined by a desire for self-education.

What is the situation in the second instance (column II)? Here among the men there is a sharply expressed focus on cognitive activities: the factor loads are high for the basic job, study and self-education, there is a marked interest in activities such as hobbies, and a good deal of time is given to social work. The representatives of the given group neglect movies and visiting. Basically, these are men focused on self-education. Among the women in this group, the features of a desire for contact are repeated. Characteristic of them is intense visiting and receiving of visitors at home, the active visiting of restaurants, movie theaters, concert halls and trips out of town.

As we see, the two incentive motives for the organizing of leisure coincided in the men and women. It turned out that human contact was more significant for the men than for the women and self-education the reverse. Incidentally, in quantitative terms this difference is slight.

The favorite activity among men in group III is the reading of books, newspapers and magazines at home. They willingly participate in social work, they often make walks not far from home and love to travel out of the city.

Among the women of group III, in addition to these activities, there is still a focus on the basic job and visiting theaters and the movies. Activities gravitating to

the family circle stand out. The range of activities provides grounds to speak about a focus on home leisure.

Certainly these motives do not exhaust the organizing of free time of the Leningraders. The practical importance of the conclusions drawn is that differentiated criteria are introduced for satisfying the leisure needs of the inhabitants of a major city. This is aided by the common feature found in their free time and this time merits regular "sounding."

Footnote

1. The calculations were carried out at the Computer Center of the Institute for Socioeconomic Problems of the USSR Academy of Sciences according to the programs of Candidate of Physicomathematical Sciences, T. Khachaturova.

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